Abstract
It is generally assumed that relations of necessity cannot be known by induction on experience. In this paper, I propose a notion of situated possibilities, weaker than nomic possibilities, that is compatible with an inductivist epistemology for modalities. I show that assuming this notion, not only can relations of necessity be known by induction on our experience, but such relations cannot be any more underdetermined by experience than universal regularities. This means that any one believing in a universal regularity is as well warranted to believe in the corresponding relation of necessity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armstrong, D. (1983). What is a law of nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barwise, J., & Perry, J. (1983). Situations and attitudes The Journal of Philosophy, 78:668–91
Campbell, S. (2001). Fixing a hole in the ground of induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(4), 553–563.
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44(2), 248–268.
Foster, J. (1982). Induction, explanation and natural necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83, 87–101.
French, S. (2014). The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Giere, R. N. (1999). Science without laws. Science and its conceptual foundations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goodman, N. (1954). Fact, fiction & forecast (Vol. 25). London: University of London.
Hale, B. (2003). Knowledge of possibility and of necessity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 103(1), 1–20.
Hawke, P. (2011). Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Philosophical Studies, 153(3), 351–364.
Kratzer, A. (2008). In A. Kratzer (Ed.), Situations in natural language semantics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nyrup, R. (2015). How explanatory reasoning justifies pursuit: A Peircean view of IBE. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 749–760.
Roca-Royes, S. (2017). Similarity and possibility: An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities. In Modal epistemology after rationalism (pp. 221–245). Bob Fischer and Felipe Leon.
Stove, D. (1986). The rationality of induction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strohminger, M. (2015). Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities. Philosophical Perspectives, 29(1), 363–375.
van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, D. C. (1963). The ground of induction. New York: Russell & Russell.
Wright, C. (1986). Facts and certainty. Proceedings of the British Academy, 71, 429–472.
Wright, J. (2018). An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: Defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ruyant, Q. The Inductive Route Towards Necessity. Acta Anal 35, 147–163 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00402-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00402-3