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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence

  • Marc-Kevin DaoustEmail author
Article

Abstract

Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.

Keywords

Knowledge Apparent reasons Coherence Blame Epistemic norms 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Daniel Laurier, who has provided invaluable feedback on this paper.

Funding

This research was supported by the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (grant no. 767-2016-1771).

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

Marc-Kevin Daoust declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Département de philosophieUniversité de MontréalQCCanada

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