A ‘Mere Cambridge’ Test to Demarcate Extrinsic from Intrinsic Properties
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I argue that a ‘mere Cambridge’ test can yield a mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, partition of properties between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. Unlike its rivals, this account can be extended to partition 2nd- and higher-order properties of properties. A property F is intrinsic, I claim, iff the same relation of resemblance holds between all and only possible instances of F. By contrast, each possible bearer of an extrinsic property has a determinate relation to some independently contingent concrete object(s). Such a relation can hold for concrete and abstract objects, of objects which are not remotely duplicates, and can vary from one possible duplicate to another. I compare this with accounts which do not allow extension to 2nd- and higher-order properties and give preliminary rebuttals for some main difficulties raised for the account advocated.
KeywordsIntrinsic Extrinsic ‘Mere Cambridge’ change Lewis Francescotti
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The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
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