A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference
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In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice (Studia Logica, 96, 289–313, 2010) the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. Within this theory, we propose a new logicist approach to natural numbers. Then, we compare our logicism with Frege’s traditional logicism.
KeywordsPlural reference Plural quantification Logical concepts Logicism
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