Acta Analytica

, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 225–234 | Cite as

In Defence of Transcendentism

  • Damiano Costa
  • Alessandro Giordani


How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and do not have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.


Extended Region Temporal Part Proper Part Locate Entity Football Match 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland
  2. 2.Institute for Philosophical StudiesLuganoSwitzerland
  3. 3.Catholic University of MilanMilanItaly

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