A New Evil Demon? No Problem for Moderate Internalists
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The New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) is often seen as a serious objection to externalist theories of justification. In fact, some internalists think it is a decisive counterexample to externalism. Recently, Moon (Episteme 9:345–360, 2012) has argued that internalists face their own New Evil Demon Problem. According to Moon, it is possible for a demon to remove one’s unaccessed mental states while leaving the justificatory status of her accessed mental states unaffected. Since this is contrary to the claims of many forms of internalism, Moon maintains that his New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism shows that internalists face a problem that is just as troubling as the original NEDP. I argue that moderate internalists have nothing to fear from Moon’s demon.
KeywordsEpistemic justification Externalism Internalism New Evil Demon Problem
Thanks to John G. Bennett, Matt Frise, Jon Matheson, Andrew Moon, Ted Poston, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and discussion of earlier drafts.
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