Acta Analytica

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 87–95 | Cite as

Swinburne on Basing and Deviant Inferential Pathways



In his Epistemic Justification (2001), Swinburne offers a sophisticated and intuitively plausible causal-doxastic analysis of the basing relation that has escaped the attention of those working on this relation, where the basing relation can be understood as the relation that holds between a reason and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna in the literature by arguing that, despite its initial plausibility, Swinburne’s analysis of the basing relation is subject to a simple counterexample and so must be rejected.


Swinburne Basing Justification 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKwantlen Polytechnic UniversitySurreyCanada

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