Swinburne on Basing and Deviant Inferential Pathways
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- Ruloff, C. Acta Anal (2015) 30: 87. doi:10.1007/s12136-014-0222-z
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In his Epistemic Justification (2001), Swinburne offers a sophisticated and intuitively plausible causal-doxastic analysis of the basing relation that has escaped the attention of those working on this relation, where the basing relation can be understood as the relation that holds between a reason and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna in the literature by arguing that, despite its initial plausibility, Swinburne’s analysis of the basing relation is subject to a simple counterexample and so must be rejected.