Acta Analytica

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 83–98 | Cite as

Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge

  • Masashi KasakiEmail author


Jennifer Lackey challenges the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle, viz., that knowledge that p is sufficient to rationally act on p, by proposing a set of alleged counterexamples. Her aim is not only to attack the knowledge-action principle, but also to undermine an argument for subject-sensitive invariantism. Lackey holds that her examples are counterexamples to the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle because (a) S knows the proposition in question, but (b) it is not rational for S to act on it. In this paper, first, I argue against (a) on intuitive and on theoretical grounds. Second, I point out that (b), even if combined with (a), is not sufficient to make for counterexamples to the knowledge-action principle of the relevant kind. Third, I offer two alternative explanations of the intuition Lackey relies on. If either one of them is right, (b) may not be satisfied in her examples.


Subject-Sensitive Invariantism Knowledge-Action Principle Isolated Secondhand Knowledge Testimonial Knowledge Jennifer Lackey 



I thank Roger Clarke, Jeremy Fantl, and Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of the paper. A short version of the paper was presented at the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. I appreciate discussions there, especially with Jennifer Lackey.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Engineering ScienceOsaka UniversityToyonakaJapan

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