Acta Analytica

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 295–319 | Cite as

Simple Concepts

  • Pavel Materna


To talk about simple concepts presupposes that the notion of concept has been aptly explicated. I argue that a most adequate explication should abandon the set-theoretical paradigm and use a procedural approach. Such a procedural approach is offered by Tichý´s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). Some main notions and principles of TIL are briefly presented, and as a result, concepts are explicated as a kind of abstract procedure. Then it can be shown that simplicity, as applied to concepts, is well definable as a property relative to conceptual systems, each of which is determined by a finite set of simple (‘primitive’) concepts. Refinement as a method of replacing simple concepts by compound concepts is defined.


Concept Conceptual system Constructions Set-theoretical paradigm Transparent intensional logic 



I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for his/her valuable improvements of the text.

This paper has been supported by the Grant Agency of Czech Republic Project No. P401/10/0792.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Filosofický ústav AV ČRPrahaČeská Republika

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