That knowledge does not depend on truth is a consequence of a basic principle concerning dependence applied to the case of knowledge: that A depends on C, and that B depends on C, do not mean that A depends on B. This is a standard causal scenario, where two things with a common cause are not themselves causally dependent. Similarly, knowledge that p depends in part on some combination of the belief that p, the fact that p and the proposition that p, and perhaps other facts or even objects. Truth depends on a proper sub-class of the elements on which knowledge depends. It does not follow that knowledge depends on truth, and the idea that it does is implausible.
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Notes
Many thanks to Hamid Vahid for written comments, to Jonathan Lowe a four minute conversation while waiting in a corridor, and to a referee for this journal.
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Zangwill, N. Does Knowledge Depend on Truth?. Acta Anal 28, 139–144 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0161-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0161-5