Acta Analytica

, Volume 27, Issue 3, pp 335–344 | Cite as

More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang

Review Paper

Abstract

Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang (2012) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we use an important yet overlooked distinction between truthmakers and determiners to help drive this point home.

Keywords

The direct argument Frankfurt-style counterexamples Moral responsibility Source incompatibilism Truthmakers 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Politics, Philosophy, and Public AffairsWashington State UniversityPullmanUSA
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and HumanitiesUniversity of Texas at ArlingtonArlingtonUSA

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