Acta Analytica

, Volume 26, Issue 3, pp 285–293 | Cite as

Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal

  • J. Adam CarterEmail author


Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.


Epistemic value Truth Value of truth Omniscience Epistemic normativity 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland

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