Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal
- 128 Downloads
Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.
KeywordsEpistemic value Truth Value of truth Omniscience Epistemic normativity
- Brogaard, B. (2005). I know. Therefore I understand. (unpublished).Google Scholar
- Lemos, R. (1995). The nature of value: axiological investigations. Gainesville: University of North Florida Press.Google Scholar
- Sosa, E. (2000). For the love of truth. In L. Zagzebski & A. Fairweather (Eds.), Virtue epistemology: Essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility (pp. 49–62). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar