Acta Analytica

, Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 175–194 | Cite as

Expressivism about Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge



The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to suggest how this expressivism about knowledge explains the value of knowledge. The paper considers how an account of the value of knowledge based on expressivism about knowledge responds to the Meno Problem, the Swamping Problem, and a variety of other questions that pertains to the value of knowledge, and the role of knowledge in our cognitive ecology.


Value of knowledge Epistemic expressivism The Meno Problem The swamping problem The value problem Inquiry 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Section of Philosophy, Department of Media, Cognition and CommunicationUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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