Acta Analytica

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 165–173 | Cite as

The Propositions We Assert

Article
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Abstract

According to Scott Soames, proper names have no descriptive meaning. Nonetheless, Soames maintains that proper names are typically used to make descriptive assertions. In this paper, I challenge Soames’ division between meaning and what is asserted, first by arguing that competent speakers always make descriptive assertions with name-containing sentences, and then by defending an account of proper name meaning that accommodates this fact.

Keywords

Proper names Descriptions Assertion Propositions Meaning 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentWake Forest UniversityWinston-SalemUSA

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