Abstract
In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments. For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts by constructing prototypes. This should lead us to abandon our general default hostility to concept nativism and be much more sceptical of claims made on behalf of learning theories.
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Cain, M.J. Concept nativism and the rule following considerations. Acta Anal 21, 77–101 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1016-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1016-8