Abstract
Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in order to have moral knowledge. I will call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Blum, L. A. (1994): Moral Perception and Particularity, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Damasio, A. (1994): Descartes’ Error, New York: Putnam.
Dancy, J. (2004): Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (1993): Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell.
Dancy, J. (1983): ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties’, Mind, XCII, 530–547.
Dancy, J. (1981): ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, XC, 367–385.
de Sousa, R. (1987): The Rationality of Emotions, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Ewing, A. C. (1929): The Morality of Punishment, London: Kegan Paul.
Hudson, W. D. (1967), Ethical Intuitionism, London: Macmillan.
Little, M. O. (1995): ‘Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology’, Hypatia, 10, 117–137.
Nussbaum, M. (2001): Upheavals of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Prichard, H. A. (1912): ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, Mind, 21, 21–37.
Reid, T. (1969a) [1785]: Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The M.I.T. Press.
Reid, T. (1969b) [1788]: Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The M.I.T. Press.
Roeser, Sabine, ‘Defending Moral Intuition’, in René van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser and Ron Rood (eds.) (2005), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 231–250.
Ross, W. D. (1927): ‘The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics’, International Journal of Ethics, 37, 113–127.
Scherer, K. R. (1984): ‘On the Nature and Function of Emotion: A Component Process Approach’, in Klaus R. Scherer and Paul Ekman (eds.), Approaches to Emotion, Hillsdale, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 293–317.
Solomon, R. (1993): The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, Indianapolis: Hackett.
Zagzebski, L. (2003): ‘Emotion and Moral Judgment’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 104–124.
Zajonc, R.B. (1984): ‘The Interaction of Affect and Cognition’, in Scherer and Ekman (1984), 239–257.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Work on this paper was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant number 275-20-007.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Roeser, S. A particularist epistemology: ‘Affectual intuitionism’. Acta Anal 21, 33–44 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1013-y
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1013-y