Abstract
This paper considers the view, recently put forward by David Davies in Art and Performance, that works of art should be identified with the generative performances that result in the object, rather than with the object. It attempts to disarm two of Davies arguments by, first, providing a criterion by which the contextualist can accommodate all and only the relevant generative properties as properties of the work, and, second, providing an alternative explanation for his modal intuitions. Finally, it draws attention to Davies’ difficulties in providing a clear criterion for the identity of the work of art.
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Matravers, D. Two comments and a problem for David Davies’ performance theory. Acta Anal 20, 32–40 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1009-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1009-z