Acta Analytica

, Volume 18, Issue 1–2, pp 43–69 | Cite as

An analysis of the a priori and a posteriori

  • Jeremy Fantl
Epistemology
  • 84 Downloads

Abstract

I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori solely dependent on the revisability relations that obtain among the faculties that deliver the belief and all other faculties.

Keywords

a priori a posteriori unrevisability faculties justification rationalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeremy Fantl
    • 1
  1. 1.Expository WritingHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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