, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 211–223 | Cite as

Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many

  • Thomas SattigEmail author


The problem of the many poses the task of explaining mereological indeterminacy of ordinary objects in a way that sustains our familiar practice of counting these objects. The aim of this essay is to develop a solution to the problem of the many that is based on an account of mereological indeterminacy as having its source in how ordinary objects are, independently of how we represent them. At the center of the account stands a quasi-hylomorphic ontology of ordinary objects as material objects with multiple individual forms.


Vagueness Indeterminacy Material objects Problem of the many 



For comments on the material presented in this essay, I am indebted to Marta Campdelacreu, Aurélien Darbellay, Katherine Hawley, Geert Keil, Kathrin Koslicki, Dan López de Sa, Christian Nimtz, Roy Sorensen, Achille Varzi, Robbie Williams, and audiences at Humboldt University in Berlin, Bielefeld University and the Third PERSP Metaphysics Workshop in València.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TübingenTübingenGermany

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