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Metaphysica

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 197–209 | Cite as

Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness vs Indeterminate Reference

  • Dan López de SaEmail author
Article

Abstract

After presenting a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness and the main tenets of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, the paper critically discusses the objection that such a view requires that at least some vagueness not be just constituted by semantic indecision—but rather by the metaphysical vagueness of some semantic relations themselves submitted by Trenton Merricks and, more recently, Nathan Salmon.

Keywords

Vagueness Semantic indecision Metaphysical vagueness Indeterminacy 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I presented an earlier version of this material for the Arché Academic Audit in St Andrews, June 2007. Then and there the Arché Vagueness Conference also took place, at which Rosanna Keefe commented on a version of Salmon’s paper. Although these were independent from each other, my thinking about these matters has been greatly influenced by her work on these issues, in particular Keefe (2000, 2010). Thanks to participants in these events and in the LOGOS Seminar, and in particular to Aurélien Darbellay, Manuel García-Carpintero, Miguel A Sebastián, Crispin Wright, Elia Zardini, and, specially, Rosanna Keefe. Research has been partially funded by FFI2008-06153, FFI2012-35026, and CSD2009-0056 (Gobierno de España); 2009SGR-1077 (Generalitat de Catalunya); and ITN FP7-238128 (European Community).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència and LOGOSUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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