, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 181–195 | Cite as

Interrelations and Dissimilarities Between Distinct Approaches to Ontic Vagueness

  • Marc Andree Weber


This paper outlines the often striking parallels of various approaches to ontic vagueness, as well as their even more striking differences. Though circling around the same idea, some of these approaches were developed to solve quite diverse theoretical problems and encounter different challenges. In addition to these difficulties, the frequently disregarded epistemological problems of all theories of ontic vagueness turn out to be even more serious under critical scrutiny. The same holds for the difficulties of deciding, for every case of vagueness, whether the vagueness involved is semantic or ontic.


Vagueness Vague objects Identity Existence 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für Staatswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie, Abteilung 2 (Rechtsphilosophie)Albert-Ludwigs-Universität FreiburgFreiburg im BreisgauGermany

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