, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 79–92 | Cite as

The Incompleteness of the World and Its Consequences

  • Jan WesterhoffEmail author


In the recent literature we find various arguments against the possibility of absolutely general quantification. Far from being merely a technical question in the philosophy of logic, the impossibility of absolutely general quantification (if established) would have severe consequence for ontology, for it would imply the non-existence of the world as traditionally conceived. This paper will investigate these implications for ontology and consider some possible ways of addressing them.


Final Account Final Theory Metaphysical Explanation Ontological Claim Absolute Generality 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of DurhamDurhamUK
  2. 2.School of Oriental and African StudiesLondonUK

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