, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 47–62 | Cite as

A Critique of Baker’s Constitution View

  • Joseph JedwabEmail author


The paper presents, motivates, critiques, and proposes revisions to Baker’s Constitution View, which includes her definitions of constitution, derivative features, and numerical sameness. The paper argues that Baker should add a mereological clause to her definition of constitution in order to avoid various counterexamples.


Lynne Rudder Baker Constitution Numerical sameness Mereology 



My thanks to Allan Bäck and John Lizza for comments on a previous draft. My thanks also to Lynne Rudder Baker for her response to my presentation of the paper in a panel discussion devoted to her work on constitution at the IAPRS 2012 Conference.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKutztown UniversityKutztownUSA

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