, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 125–130 | Cite as

Time and Simple Existence

  • Giuliano TorrengoEmail author


Sceptics about substantial disputes in ontology often argue that when two philosophers seem to disagree on a quantified claim, they are actually equivocating on the notion of existence that they are using. When temporal elements play a central role, as in the debate between presentists and eternalists, the hypothesis of an equivocation with respect to existence acquires more plausibility. However, the anti-sceptic can still argue that this hypothesis is unjustified.


Existence Ontological dispute Presentism Eternalism 



For financial supports, thanks to the projects FFI2011-29560-C02-01 and FFI2011-25626 of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (MICINN). For useful discussions on a previous draft, thanks to Bryan Pickel, Mauro Dorato, and Achille Varzi.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS Group, Department de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la CiènciaUniversity de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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