Metaphysica

, 12:213

Mind in a Humean World

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12133-011-0086-2

Cite this article as:
Harbecke, J. Int Ontology Metaphysics (2011) 12: 213. doi:10.1007/s12133-011-0086-2

Abstract

The paper defends Humean approaches to autonomous mental causation against recent attacks in the literature. One important criticism launched at Humean approaches says that the truth-makers of the counterfactuals in question include laws of nature, and there are laws that support physical-to-physical counterfactuals, but no laws in the same sense that support mental-to-physical counterfactuals. This paper argues that special science causal laws and physical causal laws cannot be distinguished in terms of degrees of strictness. It follows that mental-to-physical counterfactuals are supported—or not supported—by laws in just the same way as are physical-to-physical counterfactuals.

Keywords

Mental causation Counterfactual causation Humean metaphysics Causal laws Causal overdetermination 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economics and PhilosophyWitten/Herdecke UniversityWittenGermany

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