Metaphysica

, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 97–108

Explanation, Entailment, and Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments

Original Paper

Abstract

I argue that there are Leibnizian-style cosmological arguments for the existence of God which start from very mild premises which affirm the mere possibility of a principle of sufficient reason. The utilization of such premises gives a great deal of plausibility to such types of argumentation. I spend the majority of the paper defending three major objections to such “mild” premises viz., a reductio argument from Peter van Inwagen and William Rowe, which proffers and defends the idea that a necessary proposition cannot explain a contingent one. I, then, turn to an amelioration of the Rowe/van Inwagen argument which attempts to appeal to an entailment relation between explanans and explanandum that is fettered out in terms of relevance logic. Subsequent to dispelling with that worry, I tackle objections to the utilization of weak principles of sufficient reason that depend essentially upon agglomerative accounts of explanation.

Keywords

Explanation Entailment Implication God 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Chicago State UniversityChicagoUSA
  2. 2.Purdue University North CentralWestvilleUSA
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyNorthern Illinois UniversityDeKalbUSA

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