Perdurance, Endurance, and ‘Having a Property Atemporally’
In this paper, I argue that both perdurance theory and the ‘relations-to-times’ endurantist view rely on an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of ‘atemporal’ which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or to bear a relation atemporally. I show that standard presentations of the theories considered are indeterminate as to which of these two understandings is the intended one. I claim that even if both understandings are admissible, one of them is more attractive and has more to recommend than the other.
KeywordsPerdurance theory Persistence Change Atemporal
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