Metaphysica

, Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 159–171 | Cite as

Perdurance, Endurance, and ‘Having a Property Atemporally

Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that both perdurance theory and the ‘relations-to-times’ endurantist view rely on an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of ‘atemporal’ which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or to bear a relation atemporally. I show that standard presentations of the theories considered are indeterminate as to which of these two understandings is the intended one. I claim that even if both understandings are admissible, one of them is more attractive and has more to recommend than the other.

Keywords

Perdurance theory Persistence Change Atemporal 

References

  1. Hawley, Katherine 2001. How Things Persist. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  2. Lewis, David 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
  3. Lewis, David. 2002. “Tensing the Copula”, Mind 111: 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Rodríguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2003). ‘What is wrong with the relational theory of change?’ in H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds., Real Metaphysics, (Routledge): 184–195.Google Scholar
  5. Sider, Theodore 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. (Oxford: Clarendon).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Logos Research Group (Barcelona) and The University of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

Personalised recommendations