Hot Wind, Cold Sun: Kuhn, Vygotsky, Halliday and Metaphors in Science and Science Education

Abstract

How and why do crises happen in the history of science? What can they tell us about how crises happen in child psychological development and child behavior? And—as a bonus question—can crises in child development tell us anything about crises in science history? We compare and contrast two superficially similar answers. Then we look at three models for the formation of general, abstract concepts in children developed in integrative psychological and behavioral science by the Soviet pioneer L.S. Vygotsky. Using later, but similarly integrative, linguistic work by M.A.K. Halliday on generality, abstraction and metaphor in child language, we consider a real test case. An outstanding anomaly in solar physics is that the solar wind is actually far hotter than the surface of the sun itself, and a recent paper argues that the energy comes from the damping of waves in the plasma. We analyze the language of a ten-year-old Chinese boy trying to make sense of this phenomenon, and we find that lexicogrammatical metaphors play a very important role in posing the problem to the child, but a process of limiting and deflating metaphors is key to his understanding. This process of limitation and deflation, which corresponds to a crisis, shows us that the analogy between concept development in children in science and the same process in children is no mere metaphor.