The ‘Self’ Aspects: the Sense of the Existence, Identification, and Location

Abstract

The present article is limited to research studies focused on understanding the phenomenon and construction of the concept of ‘Self.’ When we look at one’s experience of the Self, as a whole, it involves various components associated with different aspects like self-identification, self-location and the sense of the existence of oneself or the sense of Self. While exploring the Self phenomenon, many scientific studies consider only partial aspects of the experience, and hence any understanding resulting from such an evaluation makes it difficult to comment on the nature of the Self. We emphasize that while studying the Self, to understand it totally, one would need to include all the components of the Self. In this connection, we raise the following two theses: a) Ontologically, the Self is conceived as a sentient entity, the bearer of the “what it is like to be” type of feeling, and b) Phenomenologically, we do not have a direct apprehension of the Self, but experience various aspects of the Self through the Senses of Existence, Identification, and Location.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this article, we address the ontological and phenomenological status of the conscious psychological Self with capitol S (in order to distinguish it from the prefix “self”).

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Acknowledgments

We thank our reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions that helped in improving the paper. Prof. Sisir Roy is indebted to the Homi Bhabha Trust, Mumbai for their support.

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Reddy, J.S.K., Roy, S., de Souza Leite, E. et al. The ‘Self’ Aspects: the Sense of the Existence, Identification, and Location. Integr. psych. behav. 53, 463–483 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-019-9476-8

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Keywords

  • The self
  • Self-location
  • Self-identification
  • Self-awareness
  • Consciousness
  • Minimal self