Abstract
In a recent paper called To think human out of the machine paradigm, it is stated that psychological science operates within a machine paradigm that is committed to mechanical causality. In addition, it is emphasizes the epistemological and methodological limitations of explanations based in deterministic mechanics and instead argues for the need of an ‘organic paradigm’ that takes into consideration psychological processes such as subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and agency. Although there is no doubt that much psychological science has operated under a machine paradigm, we argue that recent psychological research is pursued using a wide variety of approaches and with an absence of a partially integrated meta-theoretical corpus. The present situation looks more like a Tower of Babel of epistemological approaches and empirical programs. The reconsideration of the organic paradigm and an explicitly addressed epistemological framework could constitute a step forward and lead to an explanatory pluralism built on greater dialogue within the psychological sciences.
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Barutta, J., Aravena, P. & Ibáñez, A. The Machine Paradigm and Alternative Approaches in Cognitive Science. Integr. psych. behav. 44, 176–183 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-010-9116-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-010-9116-9