Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort

  • Published:
Journal of Labor Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Previous theoretical work examining labor tournaments concluded that an affirmative action program will always reduce the effort supplied by agents, thereby reducing output and profit for the tournament administrator; however, experimental results sometime contradict this conclusion. In the context of a labor tournament I demonstrate that there exists an affirmative action program that induces both types of agents to provide greater effort. In some instances the effort maximizing affirmative action program will also give both types of agents an equal chance of winning the tournament.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt, “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (1992), 517–518.

  2. Given the restrictions on parameter values, the greater-than-mode solution will always yield positive effort levels. However, some additional restrictions are necessary to guarantee that the less-than-mode solution produces positive effort levels. The numerator of \(e_{j,ltm}^ * \) will be positive if k < 2a and the denominator of \(e_{j,ltm}^ * \) will be positive if \(c < 8a^{2} \alpha \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {\alpha {{\left( {{\left( {\alpha - 1} \right)}{\left( {M - m} \right)}} \right)}}}} \right. \kern-\nulldelimiterspace} {{\left( {{\left( {\alpha - 1} \right)}{\left( {M - m} \right)}} \right)}}\). Thus an upper bound on both k and c will guarantee positive effort level for the less-than-mode solution.

References

  • Dukerich J, Weigelt K, Schotter A (1990) A game theory analysis of dual discrimination. Org Behav Human Decis Process XLVII:21–41

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fu Q (2006) A theory of affirmative action in college admission. Econ Inq XLIV:420–428

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holzer H, Neumark D (2000) Assessing affirmative action. J Econ Lit XXXVIII:483–568

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazear E, Rosen S (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J Polit Econ LXXXIX:841–864

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Keefe M, Viscusi K, Seckhauser R (1984) Economic contests: comparative reward schemes. J Labor Econ II:27–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schotter A, Weigelt K (1992) Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: some experimental results. Q J Econ CVII:511–539

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu S, Roe B (2005) Behavioral and welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance contract: some experimental evidence. Am J Agric Econ LXXXVII:130–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu S, Roe B (2006) Tournaments, fairness and risk. Am J Agric Econ LXXXVIII:561–573

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Oklahoma State University, 339 Business Building, Stillwater, OK, 74078-4011, USA

    James R. Fain

Authors
  1. James R. Fain
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James R. Fain.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fain, J.R. Affirmative Action Can Increase Effort. J Labor Res 30, 168–175 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-009-9062-9

Keywords

Search

Navigation