Skip to main content
Log in

Monopsony and teachers’ salaries in Georgia

Journal of Labor Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Cite this article

Abstract

Does monopsony power in the labor market for teachers affect teachers’ salaries? Prior studies have found mixed evidence of monopsony effects in teacher labor markets. A major problem has been controlling for union wage effects, which potentially mask the wage-depressing effects of monopsony. We use data from the state of Georgia, one of the few states in the United States where no teacher bargaining takes place. We detect no evidence of lower average teacher salaries in less competitive labor markets. We also find limited evidence that salaries of beginning teachers may be about two percent lower in less competitive labor markets, but our findings are not robust with respect to our various measures of monopsony and labor market boundaries. We conclude that even in the absence of unions the effect of monopsony on teachers’ salaries appears to be very small.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price includes VAT (Canada)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Baird, Robert N. and John H. Landon. “The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers’ Salaries: Comment.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 25 (April 1972): 410–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boal, William M. “The Effects of Minimum Salaries on Employment of Teachers.” unpublished paper at <www.drake.edu/cbpa/econ/boal/, 2000>.

  • — and Michael R. Ransom. “Monopsony in the Labor Market.” Journal of Economic Literature 35 (March 1997): 86–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd, Donald, Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. “The Draw of Home: How Teachers’ Preferences for Proximity Disadvantage Urban Schools.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, forthcoming.

  • Card, David and Alan B. Krueger. Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duncombe, William and John Yinger. “Does School District Consolidation Cut Costs?” Syracuse University, Center for Policy Research. 2000.

  • Georgia Professional Standards Commission. The Georgia Teaching Force 2001, Status Report. Atlanta: GPSC, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gustman, Alan L. and M.O. Clement. “Teachers’ Salary Differentials and Equality of Educational Opportunity.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 31 (October 1977): 61–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holmes, Alexander B. “Union Activity and Teacher Salary Structure.” Industrial Relations 18 (Winter 1979): 79–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, Marvin B. and David L. Mack. “Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers: Empirically—A Reply.” State and Local Government Review 10 (September 1978): 112–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Landon, John H. and Robert N. Baird. “Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers.” American Economic Review 61 (December 1971): 966–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lester, Richard A. Economics of Labor, 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1964.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipsky, David B. and John E. Drotning. “The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers’ Salaries in New York State.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27 (October 1973): 18–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luizer, James and Robert Thornton. “Concentration in the Labor Market for Public School Teachers.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39 (July 1986): 573–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lund, John and Cheryl Maranto. “Public Sector Labor Law: An Update.” In Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson, and Douglass Hyatt, eds. Public Sector Employment in a Time of Transition. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1996, pp. 21–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manning, Alan. Monopsony in Motion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merrifield, John. “Monopsony Power in the Market for Teachers: Why Teachers Should Support Market-Based Education Reform.” Journal of Labor Research 20 (Summer 1999): 377–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • “No Contest: Arkansas Gets Its Priorities Right,” The Economist, February 22, 2003.

  • Ransom, Michael R., William M. Boal, and Paul M. Beck. “Empirical Tests of Labor Monopsony: School Teachers in Missouri.” Unpublished manuscript, 1999.

  • Strauss, Robert P. “Who Gets Hired to Teach? The Case of Pennsylvania.” In Marci Kanstoroom and Chester E. Finn Jr., eds. Better Teachers, Better Schools. Washington, DC: Fordham Foundation Press, 1999, pp. 103–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thornton, Robert J. “Monopsony and Teachers’ Salaries: Some Contrary Evidence.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 28 (July 1975): 574–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Medcalfe, S., Thornton, R.J. Monopsony and teachers’ salaries in Georgia. J Labor Res 27, 537–554 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-006-1019-7

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12122-006-1019-7

Keywords

Navigation