Abstract
As various forms of nonmonogamy have grown in social visibility, the subject has received academic treatment across a range of literatures, including philosophy. To aid in philosophical treatment, the paper addresses the narrow but fundamental topic of the meaning of nonmonogamy. By engaging with recent literature, it examines nonmonogamy as the rejection of or opposition to monogamy. After exploring the nature of opposition in this case, the paper develops the beginnings of a more detailed theory of nonmonogamy. How do monogamy and nonmonogamy relate? If nonmonogamy is a rejection, what content does the concept of nonmonogamy have? The paper does not criticize monogamy or defend nonmonogamy, but it aims to take part in building the conceptual foundations for nonmonogamy as a political project.
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Notes
Clardy, Why it’s Ok to Not be Monogamous, p. 23.
This form of negation, the one that concerns me in what follows, is known as “affixal negation”—marking a negation by affixing ‘a’, ‘un’, or ‘non’ to an affirmative or positive term. Aristotle recognizes this form of negation in Metaphysics (1022b33). For a background discussion see Cruse, “Three Classes of Antonyms in English.”.
When I refer to a concept, I underline it. Single inverted commas indicate mentioning a term.
The term ‘amatonormativity’ comes from Elizabeth Brake. I give it my own gloss, but Brake says amatonormativity “consists in the assumptions that a central, exclusive, amorous relationship is normal for humans, in that it is a universally shared goal, and that such a relationship is normative, in that it should be aimed at in preference to other relationship types” (Minimizing Marriage, p. 88-9).
I do my best to avoid addressing propositions and their negations (e.g. “Monogamy is good” and “It is not the case that monogamy is good”). Instead, I focus on affirmative and negative concepts (e.g. monogamy and nonmonogamy). My discussion is informed by some work on Kant’s theory of concepts and by extension Aristotle’s. Aristotle thinks that ‘affirmation’ does not describe single terms (Categories 2a5). I will speak more loosely and say that terms and concepts can be affirmations, i.e. when they are not negated. But in general, I will say “affirmative concept.”.
The examples concern propositions, not concepts. If we wanted to analyze the issue further, we would need to work out the relation between toothed and the adult human concepts. Supposing adult humans are naturally toothed, the toothless adult human concept combines a negative concept (toothless) with a concept that could include the corresponding affirmative concept (toothed). This type of inconsistency indicates privation, but there is complexity here.
The Stoics noticed this difference. Diogenes Laertius provides the following distinction made by the Stoics: “Division is the cutting of a genus into its immediate species; for example, of animals, some are rational and some are irrational. Counterdivision is a division of a genus into a species in virtue of its opposite, as when things are divided by negation; for example, of beings, some are good and some are not good” (7.61).
The tricky case concerns a possible ultimate genus—a genus that is not a species of a higher genus. If the ultimate genus is ‘entity’, for example, then ‘non-entity’ might be a concept with no content.
Chalmers’ argument in “Is Monogamy Morally Permissible?” can be interpreted along these lines. Kyle York offers a response in “Why Monogamy is Morally Permissible.”.
Clardy, Why it's Ok, p. 35-9. The same can be said about singlehood, which Clardy discusses on p. 39–43. My claim is not that friendships cannot be cases of nonmonogamy. There are romantic friendships.
See also Jenkins’ use of the term: “I’ll use ‘dyadic’ to describe love relationships that involve exactly two parties.” Jenkins then defines monogamy as dyadic and exclusive. My discussion here and in the final section indicates that I think exclusivity is the key feature of monogamy (“Modal Monogamy” sec. 2). See also Hidalgo, Barber, and Hunter, “The Dyadic Imaginary.”
This ambiguity in the term ‘dyadic’ can help respond to what Chalmers calls the “specialness defense” of monogamy: the claim that romantic relationships must be monogamous for the partner to be special, in some distinctive and important sense (Chalmers, “Is Monogamy Morally Permissible?” 228).
This seems closer to Clardy’s meaning (see Why it's Ok, p. 17).
Rambukkana, Fraught Intimacies, p. 15; quoted by Clardy at Why it's Ok, p. 26.
Wiley, “‘Christian Nations’,‘Polygamic Races’ and Women’s Rights,” fn. 2.
I am borrowing and simplifying from Justin Gale, “Opposites and Plato's Principle of Change in the Phaedo Cyclical Argument.” See also David Sedley, “Plato’s Theory of Change at Phaedo 70–71.” Note that some types are consistent with each other.
See Gale, “Opposites and Plato’s Principle of Change,” fn. 16.
This commits me to the view that monogamish relationships (a term coined by Dan Savage to refer to relationships that are largely monogamous but that allow for some other romantic relationships) are nonmonogamous. After all, something that is xish is like x but not x. See Oppenheimer, “Married, with Infidelities'' for background.
I need not claim that all hallmarks of monogamy are scalar concepts. However, as I have suggested, I think exclusivity is the core of monogamy.
I am open to the idea that shortcomings with respect to importance can be cashed out in terms of exclusivity. For instance, the monogamous relationship does not have the proper importance because certain emotions that should be directed (exclusively) towards the monogamous partner are instead directed elsewhere.
One reason in favor of viewing possessiveness and jealousy as derivative of exclusivity is that, otherwise, one needs to find a way to distinguish jealousy stemming from the values that structure the romantic relationship (e.g. the feeling you have when your partner seems to be flirting with someone else at a party) from other instances of jealousy (e.g. wishing you had your partner’s effortless charisma or well-toned calves).
See Clardy, Why it’s Ok, p. 64-8 and Chalmers’ discussion of jealousy (“Is Monogamy Morally Permissible?” p. 235-40). See also Ronald de Sousa, “Love, Jealousy, and Compersion.”
There is a complexity here that I will not explore. While jealousy and compersion are opposites, and compersion is an important value in nonmonogamy, it is not right to say that ideal monogamy exhibits maximal jealousy. Jealousy typically emerges when there is uncertainty about a partner’s commitment to the exclusivity values. Monogamous people then seek to alleviate jealousy by firming up commitments to exclusivity. Since there is always uncertainty, the specter of jealousy looms. Nonmonogamy, by contrast, addresses jealousy by examining the relational values at the root of the emotion.
Rambukkana, Fraught Intimacies, p. 15-6.
The nature of the relation between ‘commitment’ and its opposite is an interesting question that I do not explore here.
I am inclined to think that an ideal is unattainable by definition. But nothing important depends on this, from what I can tell. I say more below.
References
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Biondi, Z. What it Means to Reject Monogamy. Sexuality & Culture 28, 1207–1217 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-023-10175-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12119-023-10175-y