Introduction

Before the 1990s, the most popular illicit drug in Hong Kong was heroin supplied from the Golden Triangle. Around the turn of the millennium, heroin was gradually replaced with psychotropic substances such as ketamine and crystal meth (Chu 2000; So 2017). These substances can now be manufactured in factories housed in the villages of mainland China for both local consumption and export. As disclosed by So (2017), there are two routes of drug supply into Hong Kong through brokers (Fig. 1). The first route is managed by Hong Kong-based drug bosses who store drugs in the rural areas of the New Territories and distribute them through large retail groups. The groups employ couriers to deliver drugs to customers or to lower-level drug dealers who sell them in ounces. In the second route, the drug bosses are based in Shenzhen (a mainland city adjacent to Hong Kong) and manage the sale of the drugs through drug dealers of various sizes (who sell them in kilograms, ounces or grams). In addition, there is a group of user-dealers, normally young people, who abuse drugs and simultaneously sell drugs to their friends to earn back the cost (So 2017).

Fig. 1
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Structure of drug dealing operations in Hong Kong (source: So, 2017)

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The drug market is dominated by triad members because they have the underground connections to obtain the drug supply and the ability and manpower to protect their turf on which drugs are transacted. Chu (2000) suggested that individual triad members get involved in illegal businesses such as drug dealing, which are regarded as purely private ones and thus they need not seek prior approval from their Dai Lo (triad protector), and channel their profits to their societies. This is particularly true in the upper level of the drug distribution structure, so that the higher the level, the greater the involvement of triads. Very often, the low-level personnel, such as user-dealers and couriers, are not triad members. Triad societies operate under a Dai Lo–Lan Tsai (triad protector–follower) relationship, in which young street gangsters are recruited during their teens and follow a Dai Lo for many years to learn the triad subculture and crime skills. Through years of association, they are eventually “triadised” (Lo 2012) through committing crime and through other forms of daily interaction with the Dai Lo and other triad members. Drug dealing is no exception. The Lan Tsai learn the operations, norms and evasion skills (Jacobs 1996a) of the drug trade from the Dai Lo (So 2017).

Against this backdrop, the present study aims to investigate these operations and norms. In particular, it examines how drug dealers in Hong Kong adopt restrictive deterrence strategies to reduce the certainty of punishment and mitigate the severity of punishment. It explores the concrete evasion skills and the probable prerequisites for implementing the strategy, and interprets the findings using a framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation to provide an overview of this understudied area of the drug trade in Hong Kong.

Literature review

The role of deterrence in crime prevention has been a research topic in criminology for many years. Gibbs (1975) highlighted that the difference between absolute and restrictive deterrence lies in the degree to which people adapt their criminality as a response to the risk of punishment. Absolute deterrence exists when “an individual has refrained throughout life from a particular type of criminal act because in whole or in part he or she perceived some risk of someone suffering a punishment as a response to the crime” (Gibbs 1975: 32). It refers to individuals who wholly desist from criminality. Restrictive deterrence is explained as “the curtailment of a certain type of criminal activity by an individual during some period because in whole or in part the curtailment is perceived by the individual as reducing the risk that someone will be punished as a response to the activity” (Gibbs 1975: 33). What is implied by the two definitions is that some people will stop committing crime altogether to reduce the chances of punishment, whilst other people will choose to reduce their commission of crime. This notion of deterrence highlights the fact that the risk of punishment alone is not enough to stop people from committing crime, but it may reduce an offender’s participation in crime.

Certainty of punishment and severity of punishment are the underlying features of deterrence, and they are thought to be the most potent factors in determining whether and how an offender commits a crime (Guan and Lo 2021). Certainty and severity of punishment both serve a deterrent effect in crime commission (Piliavin et al. 1986; Williams and Hawkins 1989). However, some researchers have found that the certainty of punishment has the more potent influence of the two (DeJong 1997; Nagin and Pogarsky 2003; Pogarsky 2002), and that the severity of punishment appears to have a lower deterrent effect (Apel 2013; Pogarsky and Piquero 2003). Restrictive deterrence relates to individuals who do not want to stop committing crime, but who try to reduce the certainty and severity of punishment. A range of tactics devised by offenders, known as their restrictive deterrence strategy, helps them to ensure that their criminal behaviour remains undetected and unsanctioned.

Researchers studying restrictive deterrence are particularly interested in the drug offender sample because this concept is particularly fitting for drug offenders’ characteristics. Drug offenders refer to people who consume, traffic, deal in, manufacture or cultivate illegal drugs. They are often typified and sampled in the discussion of restrictive deterrence (Jacobs 1993, 1996a, b), for several reasons. Drug offenders normally receive more severe sentences than other offenders (Gallupe et al. 2011; Harrison 2001; Spohn and Holleran 2002), and thus they are more likely than other offenders to use a restrictive deterrence strategy. Another reason is drug offenders’ high recidivism rates (Harrison 2001) and long criminal careers (Casey 2015), which indicate that they are among the most judicially entrenched criminals. The utilisation of a restrictive deterrence strategy allows them to evade arrest, thus contributing to their recidivism and the further development of their criminal careers. Furthermore, compared with vandals, thieves and alcohol offenders, the effects of restrictive deterrence on drug offenders appear to be more compelling (Eck and Wartell 1998) because their responsivity towards risk and sanctions forces them to use strategies to concretise their perceptions of risk into real actions against such risks, instead of refraining from crime.

Jacobs (1996a: 425) mentioned “skills for evasion”, which are seen when offenders establish situational measures to improve the likelihood of their offences remaining undetected. For example, street criminals leverage on the banality of daily social activities to obscure criminal acts, such as passing illegal substances when shaking hands street-style. Some require performative efforts by staging drug transactions using a theatrical ensemble of props, appropriate locations, set extras and specialised terminology, which Jacobs (1996b) calls “transactional mediation”. A crucial requirement in the success of this type of transaction is that the buyers are regular customers who are aware of the “same kind of action” (Schutz 1967: 155).

Jacobs (1996b) proposes three ways of employing transactional mediation. The first is “flash decoys”, in which drug transactions are completed in motor vehicles in a similar way to the typical interaction between hitchhikers and drivers. The second is “moving screens”, which involve the performance of rehearsed movements between the dealer and the consumer to allow for a quick and smooth transaction. The third is “sleight of hand”, whereby drugs are passed via common hand gestures such as a hug or a slap. Echoing this, Guan and Lo (2021) highlighted two kinds of strategy: certainty reduction and severity mitigation. Within certainty reduction, three different techniques are identified: camouflage in public places, picking a safe time and position, and counter-reconnaissance. Within severity mitigation, four different techniques are developed: choosing a less severe activity, passing risk, stashing the product, and cooperating with the police.

In response to these evasion skills, the police adopt an undercover approach to collect drug information and evidence for prosecution. Because of their awareness of the undercover practices, drug offenders devise unique ways to spot police without getting arrested. Drug offenders tend to avoid selling to inexperienced individuals who may be targeted and under surveillance by the police. Researchers contend that drug offenders determine customers’ level of experience and maturity by assessing whether they involve themselves in excessively risky behaviour, including overdosing, or by simple age stereotypes (Jacques and Allen 2014). Moreover, drug offenders harness visual, verbal and physical clues to distinguish between undercover police buyers and real buyers. They may even test the buyers for their legitimacy (Jacobs 1993, 1996a; Jacques and Reynald 2012; Johnson and Natarajan 1995; VanNostrand and Tewksbury 1999). They use such methods repeatedly to ensure they retain their trust in their buyers. At times when dealers are unsure about the identity of their buyers, they must conduct a “peep game” (Jacobs 1996b) in which they protect their turf through methods like speaking a foreign language to determine whether the buyer is real or an undercover police officer (Knowles 1999). When a police officer’s cover has been blown, drug dealers cease all interactions and transactions (Jacques and Allen 2014).

By the same token, people working undercover can be drug dealers rather than policemen. It is suggested that dealers should be cautious about counterparts who have recently been arrested while dealing drugs but have very shortly afterwards been released by the police, because there is a high possibility that they have been recruited as snitches (Dickinson and Wright 2015), who are often charged with minor drug offences (Cross 2000). An upper-level drug dealer in Johnson and Natarajan’s (1995) research disclosed that he was lured into a trap by a drug addict and eventually imprisoned.

Another kind of restrictive deterrence would be for a criminal to engage in less severe crime through the perception that a minor crime brings a minor sanction, and therefore, for example, to sell cannabis instead of heroin. Another method is to choose a safe venue or to stash the product. For instance, drug manufacturers who produce drugs in secluded locations are less likely to be caught by the police (Gallupe et al. 2011). These are examples of common restrictive deterrence strategies utilised by drug offenders. Research has suggested that the use of drugs or violence whilst a crime is being committed, or other erratic behaviour by offenders, may actually be premeditated plans that help them improve their offending. For example, Dickinson (2020) found that drug dealers’ ideal use of violence is related to factors such as the volume and type of drug being sold, and their relationship with the drug suppliers and consumers. Jacobs and Cherbonneau (2017) also highlighted that offenders often consume drugs that suppress their arousal in order to control their fear before committing a crime.

In addition to drug offenders, Western research on restrictive deterrence has expanded to cover a wider range of offences, such as computer hacking, sex offences and car theft (Beauregard and Bouchard 2010; Cherbonneau and Copes 2006; Gallupe et al. 2011; Jacobs and Cherbonneau 2014; Jacobs and Miller 1998; Maimon et al. 2014). Overall, new strategies are developed by drug offenders to negate the threats of punishment while new threats of punishments are devised by authorities to deter offenders more effectively, and this eventually becomes a perpetual cycle (Ryan 1994). This exemplifies drug offenders’ adaptive abilities to continue their criminal practice, calling for academics and criminal justice representatives to enrich their understanding of restrictive deterrence to bring this cycle to an end.

In Chinese organised crime, criminals use different tactics to handle uncertainty and risks. For instance, some used the tactic of relational repression (Wang et al. 2021) in which they exerted pressure onto the victims and their families with the threat of disclosing the victims’ degrading information to friends in their social circle, so that the victims felt repressed and were forced to follow the criminals’ instructions. In response to market-based uncertainty such as inconsistent law enforcement and unfriendly government policy, some individuals involving in illegal street vending shared information on supplies, warehouse rental and informal consignment mechanism with each other, invented mutually agreed space-allocation rules to avoid hostile competition, and even paid for government servants’ protection (Jiang and Wang 2022). A study of buying and selling government positions in China revealed that both buyers and sellers were exposed to the risks of being detected and arrested. To mediate such risks, they only exchanged with trustworthy partners (Wang 2020). To decide on whether to trust each other, the sellers relied on previous interaction experiences with the buyers, information provided by middlemen, and any other information related to their backgrounds (e.g., whether the subordinates to be promoted are loyal), whereas the buyers assessed the sellers’ reputation and accessibility to the establishment to ensure that the money they paid would guarantee the intended promotion (Wang 2020). Research further found that “informal mechanisms of credible commitments, such as reputation, repeated interaction, hostage taking and sharing compromising information” (Varese et al. 2019: 594), helped strengthen the mutual trust of criminal partners. Furthermore, a study on peer-to-peer financial fraud in China (Lo and Kan 2022) found that in addition to the use of traditional quanxi or relational trust, criminals tried to win customers’ trust in making an investment through enhanced search quality, experience quality and credence quality of the financial company.

The framework of certainty reduction and severity mitigation

The above literature suggests that criminals are not necessarily risk-takers, but they respond to risk (Jacobs and Cherbonneau 2014) in a strategic manner to reduce the chances of arrest and sanction. Taking as references the papers by Moeller et al. (2016) and Guan and Lo (2021), the present study adopts a certainty – severity framework for punishment by splitting restrictive deterrence strategies into certainty reduction strategies and severity mitigation strategies (Fig. 2). While some of the skills encapsulate the drug dealers’ strategy to prevent arrest before or when they commit crime, some describe their strategy post-arrest.

Fig. 2
figure 2

The framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation

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Figure 2 introduces the framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation. It visualises the effect of restrictive deterrence in drug dealing. In this framework, the certainty of punishment is shown on the x-axis whilst the severity of punishment is depicted on the y-axis. The certainty reduction strategy and the severity mitigation strategy are represented along the x- and the y-axis, respectively. In the centre of the coordinate system are the factors that affect the choice of strategy to be implemented. The framework models how each strategy may mitigate the severity and reduce the certainty of punishment to reach the origin point (0, 0), which represents the successful avoidance of detection or sanction. This visualisation allows for the exploration of the possible prerequisites needed to implement each strategy.

A certainty reduction strategy ensures that, during a crime, drug offenders are hidden from police. The offenders keep a low profile, purposefully select low-risk times and places to commit crime, keep tabs on police activity, or hide behind legitimate activities for shadow, upholding the mask of a law-abiding citizen. To reduce the certainty of punishment, three techniques are identified by Guan and Lo (2021):

  • camouflage in public places (Jacobs 1996b; Jacobs and Miller 1998)

  • picking a safe position and time (Jacobs and Miller 1998; VanNostrand and Tewksbury 1999)

  • counter-reconnaissance (Jacobs 1993, 1996a; Jacques and Reynald 2012)

For a severity mitigation strategy, drug offenders are cautious of the possibility of arrest, leading them to plan for the worst. They assume that, by employing this strategy, they can diminish the possibility of an unwanted conviction or lessen the harshness of the punishment bestowed upon them when they are arrested. To mitigate the severity of punishment, four techniques are identified by Guan and Lo (2021):

  • choosing a less severe activity (Fleetwood 2014; Knowles 1999)

  • passing risk (Knowles 1999; Piza and Sytsma 2016)

  • stashing the product (Jacobs 1996b; Jacobs and Miller 1998; Moloney et al. 2015)

  • cooperating with the police (Cross 2000; Dickinson and Wright 2015)

Research methodology

After the project was approved by the institutional review board of a university, we recruited participants through counselling centres for substance abusers and street gang workers. Through purposive sampling with informed consent, we recruited five high-level drug dealers, six low-level drug dealers, two core members of low-level drug dealing groups, two user-dealers and one courier (Table 1). Twelve of these individuals claimed to be triad members. In this paper, the following definitions are adopted. Dealers are people who own and run drug businesses of any scale. High-level dealers deal in drugs (ketamine or heroin) in kilograms, while low-level dealers deal in drugs in ounces or grams; however, cocaine dealer who deal in amounts of over 10 ounces are regarded as high-level dealers because the price of cocaine is much higher. Core members are not business owners but have very close relationships with the business owners, and they are trusted by drug dealers and assist them in running the operations. User-dealers are those who deal in drugs on an irregular basis to raise money to support their drug expenses.

Table 1 Participants’ background (N = 17)
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Fieldwork by means of face-to-face semi-structured interviews, each lasting 90 to 120 min, was conducted by the first author; sometimes two or three interviews with selected participants were conducted if supplementary information was required. With prior consent and an assurance of confidentiality, the interviews were audio-recorded after the participants were reminded that no names of individuals should be disclosed during recording. The data were transcribed into Chinese and each interviewee was given a code to ensure anonymity. As the data are rich, only those related to the framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation are quoted in this paper to facilitate analysis. Selected quotations were translated into English by another author and the original meanings verified by the interviewer. For triangulation, five policemen were interviewed, but only the senior officer is cited in this paper.

The results

Camouflage in public places

Drug offenders use various methods to obscure their criminal activity from public view. This includes blending their illegal acts with their lawful day-to-day activity and disguising illegal transactions through the performance of legal activities to avoid police detection. In this study, a core member of a drug dealing group disclosed:

Our drug store is located at the upper floor of a building. It seems that our drug boss also owns the restaurant downstairs because whenever the police come, the restaurant worker would call us not to come down. I think the restaurant serves as a lookout. (D1)

Our research found that drug offenders use the leverage of existing gender stereotypes and norms to blend into the background and reduce their conspicuousness on the streets (Jacobs and Miller 1998). For example, researchers have noticed that female drug dealers include their children in drug transactions as props, to produce an image that is reflective of ordinary mothers and thus to lessen police attention (Carbone-Lopez 2015; Jacobs and Miller 1998; Moloney et al. 2015). Similarly, in this study, a 19-year-old female user-dealer described using dating for camouflage:

My boyfriend and I consumed ketamine. His triad brother helped us get drug supply and we became dealers. We packed them into small bags at home while taking ketamine at the same time. I delivered the drugs to customers with my boyfriend and we just look like we are dating. I always carried the drugs because the policemen seldom search girls. (D2)

It has been reported in research that some drug offenders operate illegal businesses under the guise of legitimate businesses or engage in a changeable routine of street activity to reduce the possibility of police interception (Fader 2016, 2019; VanNostrand and Tewksbury 1999). In our study, a courier described how he acted as a driver to create camouflage:

I deliver coke (cocaine) by car like an ordinary driver. I always hide the coke in the hidden places near the driver seat, e.g. control panel, audio equipment, jewelry box or the car horn, etc. There are plenty of spaces to hide the coke. When a customer called me asking for coke and told me the location, I drove around the location and observed the environment carefully. Then I called the customer to come to take the coke from my car. (D3)

A core member of a drug dealing group revealed that he acted as an ordinary pedestrian to give him camouflage when delivering drugs. However, he was very cautious and also worked with partners:

When I turn into an alley from the main street or vice versa, I will not walk too close to the wall or building but walk closer to the roadside, and I will also turn the corner slowly, so that I have a wider angle and more time to observe whether there are police on the other side. If there are, I will turn back immediately. Moreover, I would never put my two hands in my pocket, indicating that I am hiding something. We operate in a two-person group. The one who leads the way is the ‘lookout’ and the one hiding the drugs walks behind him so that no one would notice we are actually working partners. (D1)

Camouflage can cover dress and appearance to prevent the police from identifying the dealers easily. A crystal meth dealer explained how he transferred drug dealing knowledge and the business subculture to his couriers:

My facial appearance can show that I am a drug abuser. Therefore, I wear different coats to deliver drugs: sometimes I wear a suit, carry a manila envelope. I try to reduce the possibility of being identified by the police. I teach my Lan Tsai (triad gang followers) they shouldn’t dress like Mongkok boys [youths who hang out frequently in Mongkok, an area where triad activities are active]. They should not dye their hair golden, wear a Giordano T-shirt, and blue jeans. They will for sure be interrogated by the police. I would rather ask them to wear sports shoes, bring a football when delivering drugs. Moreover, I teach them to behave in a low-key manner, not to be too arrogant. (D5)

The findings revealed that camouflage in public places can appear in different forms, including disguising drug transactions as legitimate business, taking advantage of gender stereotypes, pretending one is engaged in ordinary street activities and having a low-key appearance and fashion style.

Picking a safe time and position

A critical aspect of certainty reduction is the choice of when and where to commit the crime. In terms of place, drug offenders are known to limit themselves to locations they feel to be safe for them (Carbone-Lopez 2015; Olaghere and Lum 2018). In public areas, some dealing takes place in secluded locations, for the benefit of the dealers. They guide customers to covert areas while their partners inspect the customers and keep an eye out if things go wrong (Jacobs 1996b). Such locations include local gathering sites like restaurants or markets, enabling dealers and customers to behave in ordinary ways and avoid intense public scrutiny of their deviant acts (Jacobs and Miller 1998). Similar findings were made in the present study. A low-level ketamine dealer explained how he acted as a restaurant user or shopper in a mall and used toilets for transactions to avoid public scrutiny:

I do my business carefully, I observe the environment every minute to check whether I am followed by the police. My customers are regular customers. The places of transaction are restaurants or toilets inside a shopping mall. That can be the toilet of a restaurant while I am having my dinner there, or in the toilet on different floors of the shopping mall. (D4)

The optimal location for some dealers is their home, as this moves the drug transactions from the public sphere to the private, creating more security for them (Moloney et al. 2015). Typically, female drug dealers opt for this choice by inviting friends to their homes for an after-party when drug dealing has been arranged (Fleetwood 2014). In the present study, an 18-year-old female user-dealer sold ketamine in a public housing estate and explained her transactions:

I thought when I took drugs, I could sell drugs to pay my expenses. Then I asked my triad friend to supply me drugs. He took the drugs to my home, and I sold drugs to my friends living in the same housing estate; I only took phone orders from them. I would not sell drugs outside the estate. It was safer that way. (D6)

In terms of time, dealing at unusual times of day increases the likelihood of being caught. With this in mind, drug dealers tend to follow pre-set ‘opening hours’ strictly, without any exceptions (Jacobs and Miller 1998). A similar observation was made in this study:

I start my work at 6 or 7 p.m. I go to a drug store to collect some drugs. Then I go to Mongkok (downtown area of Hong Kong where triad activities are operated) to operate my business. I will wait for phone calls from my customers. Normally, the calls will come after 10 p.m. Then I deliver the drugs by taxi. At around 2 to 3 a.m. after midnight, I will station myself at a disco, having fun and waiting for the phone calls at the same time. (D1)

Drug dealers choose a time and place that they think are safe, but these are contingent on police patrolling behaviour. Dealers reported that they modify their transactional patterns in response to police action. This is in line with the research of VanNostrand and Tewksbury (1999) that showed that if the police ramp up their surveillance in one region, drug offenders divert their dealings to other locations.

Counter-reconnaissance

The major threat to drug dealing is police surveillance and detection. While transactions typically occur with regular customers, it is not unusual for drug dealers to deal with new buyers by virtue of social connections. Undercover police often exploit these social networks to conduct drug busts. For counter-reconnaissance, a dealer who sold drugs with his partner in a bar explained that drug dealers operate in small groups to reduce the risk of the group being penetrated by the police:

Our group had 12 members. When we run the drug dealing business in clubs, it would be better to have a small group and ‘low-key’ members because we could prevent the police from putting a pin (undercover) in our group. We could easily identify the ghost (police informant) if the group was small. (D8)

A crystal meth dealer explained how he passed on drug dealing know-how from his boss to his triad followers, so as to avoid arrest by the undercover police:

My Dai Lo (triad protector) is my drug boss. He has instilled a concept in me: ‘no one will die if there is no ghost [police informant]’. I teach my Lan Tsai (followers) the same concept. If they suspect something is wrong, they cannot try to gamble. They must walk away first, don’t think that everything is okay. If a customer is introduced by a friend, the first two or three times they must not have direct contact with the customer. For example, my friend (A) introduces his friend (B) who wants to buy one unit (ounce) of drugs. I would call a Lan Tsai to distribute one unit to my friend (A), then my friend (A) would give the drug to his friend (B) himself. If one dealer received a phone call from a friend who said, ‘Hey! My friend wants to buy how many, how many!’ This is often the time that the police are waiting for the dealer. (D5)

The present study found that avoiding undercover police is the top priority of drug dealers in Hong Kong. Operating in a small group, never gambling with risks, and testing new customers are the means used by the dealers to avoid penetration by undercover police.

Choosing a less severe activity

The easiest way to mitigate the severity of punishment is by opting for less risky activity. Knowles (1999) points out that some drug dealers consciously decide not to become dealers for fear of facing longer prison sentences. Some dealers limit their sales to soft drugs such as marijuana, given the association between harder drugs and more severe punishments (Fleetwood 2014; Moloney et al. 2015). Other drug manufacturers who are wary of the penalties given to offenders who cultivate drugs fear that the amalgamation of producing and selling may lead to harsher penalties (Carbone-Lopez 2015). Those that encounter charges of manufacturing drugs have devised tactics, such as manufacturing in lieu of purchasing, to circumvent legislative barriers and lessen the severity of their penalties (Vidal and Décary-Hétu 2018). A similar finding was made in the present study. An experienced police officer working in the Organised Crime and Triad Bureau explained the reasons for the decrease in big drug stores in Hong Kong:

Now the number of big drug stores is dropping. If a big store is busted by the police, there is too much money involved. Drug dealers break up the drug supply from a whole into pieces, so that the quantity of drugs seized by the police is low, and the penalty is also low. They can reduce the risk, and the economic loss can be reduced. If the seized quantity of drugs is large, the penalty is higher. (PO1)

Drug dealers are sentenced according to the quantity of drugs they are holding, so, although they would not totally quit their criminal career, because of the huge financial profit involved, they have to scale down their activity by way of compromise, ensuring they face less severe sanctions.

Stashing the product

Some drug offenders who operate in sophisticated organisations have support from accomplices, whereas street dealers have the sole responsibility of ensuring that the products are stashed in a covert location in order to avoid drug trafficking charges, which are harsher than drug possession charges. Street dealers often keep a small number of products on themselves for rapid transactions, whilst the rest of their stock is hidden elsewhere (Johnson and Natarajan 1995). Common hiding spots include newspaper stands, under bottles, in caps, on the ground or in paper bags placed in neglected corners (Jacobs 1996b). Female drug dealers innovate with new hiding spots at home, such as hollow curtain rods or in a box hidden under a dog’s sleeping rug (Jacobs and Miller 1998). However, different findings were collected in the present study. As homes in Hong Kong are tiny, hiding anything illegal at home is discouraged. A drug dealer disclosed that he would hide drugs anywhere but home:

I teach my employees to hide the drugs in a fire hose reel, entrance doorplate lamp, or wall socket. Just don’t hide the drugs at home because the penalty is very high. (D15)

Research has suggested that in open commercialised areas where the majority of movement is on foot, drug dealers may opt to keep their drug stash on themselves as a safer option (Piza and Sytsma 2016). At times when drug dealers have to carry drugs on themselves, they employ carefully devised drug-handling techniques to prevent police officers’ suspicions from being aroused when they are questioned. By tightly packaging the drugs in plastic, the drugs may also be hidden inside the hand or in the mouth, which allows them to be swallowed when the dangers of being caught are high (Jacobs 1996b). The present study revealed that female dealers have more places to hide drugs than male ones:

A girl can place the drugs inside her bras or panties, or inside the shoes if she wears a pair of sports shoes. Boys can hide the drugs inside sports shoes or inside their underpants. We help them sew a pocket in their underpants. Girls have more places to hide the drugs if they have a cosmetic bag or case. The police often search the cosmetic bag quickly. I was searched by the police before, so I know the trick. I hide the drugs inside the makeup blush brush; I bought the blush brush that can stretch out and draw back. (D16)

The code of conduct followed by police officers does not permit strip-searches in public, leaving drug dealers, especially female ones, with an extra hiding spot under their clothing. The female body is considered advantageous for concealing drugs, given that there are more limitations when handling female bodies than there are with male bodies (Moloney et al. 2015). As a female user-dealer disclosed:

The police seldom body search a girl. Once, I had hidden drugs in my bra waiting for customers, two police constables approached me and asked me why I sat there at night. I answered I was waiting for my mum who was upstairs with friends. The police saw I was a young girl wearing clothes like living in the neighbourhood, so they had not searched me. (D6)

The decision of whether to store the drugs at home, on one’s person or off one’s person is contingent on the environment in which the drug dealers find themselves. Hiding drugs on the body, instead of putting them in a carrier bag, may reduce the quantity of drugs being trafficked, and, in this way, mitigate the severity of punishment if discovered.

Passing risk

Research has found that drug gangs organise their business strategically by assigning roles to different members of the gang. Some are tasked with money-handling jobs, while others have the role of delivering the drugs (Johnson and Natarajan 1995; VanNostrand and Tewksbury 1999). The kingpin of the gang who owns all the money and drugs does not take part in any activity that could risk him being exposed to the police. On the other hand, the lower-ranked gang members do the riskiest jobs (Jacobs and Miller 1998; Johnson and Natarajan 1995). A similar finding was observed in the present study. An experienced police officer working in the Organised Crime and Triad Bureau explained the issue of risk passing and trust:

There are different levels of trust among members of a drug dealing group. A drug boss would choose the individual that he has the highest level of trust with to manage the financial matters. The people that he only trusts at an ordinary level, he gives them a small quantity of drugs to distribute. Go, arrest them, no big deal. He (boss) has no relationship with them, they are only foot soldiers. Money is the most important part. An individual who handles drug money must earn a high level of trust. If not, he takes away all of the drug money. For couriers, it is okay if they are arrested. The boss can find a lot of couriers. All dealings have risk, he must learn how to pass on risk and find the right person to trust. (PO1)

In addition, two of the high-level drug dealers revealed how they passed risk to their subordinates and people in the lower strata of the distribution network. The first one explained that there was a broker system in the drug dealing structure:

We act like brokers. Brokers do not need to handle the drugs. That is, you can phone me, and I will help you get drugs. Brokers get the profit as a middle man. For example, we used HK$5,000 to get drugs, and sell them to customers for HK$5,500. Then we asked someone to deliver the drugs to the customers. We do not touch the drugs at all to reduce the risk. (D10)

Brokers serve a compartmentalising function to protect the dealers at the higher level. A similar compartmentalising function was set up by the second dealer, who explained how he had stepped back and distanced himself from his subordinates and frontline employees:

I have stepped back now. I allow my drug business to be managed by my Lan Tsai. He runs the operation and has his own circles of customers. He provides a car to the driver (courier) to deliver drugs. The car is given to him to use for free. But he is 24 h on call. (D13)

One drug dealer and his partner had a kitchen (drug manufacturing centre) to produce cocaine using a supply from a drug boss in Shenzhen. He described the couriering process in drug trafficking:

Our operation is conducted in mainland China. We traffic 5 units (ounces) across the border every time, two to three times a day. The drug storehouse in the mainland is managed by the cook (manufacturer) who is also responsible to ‘drop the drugs out onto the street’ (ship the order). After he receives an order, he puts the drugs into a station locker. Our courier collects the ‘rubbish’ (drugs) and a ‘forward’ (a core member of my group) crosses the border with him. The forward goes first, then the courier follows him. The forward can check if the border is safe. After the courier crosses the border, he gives the drugs to the forward. If the courier fails, he will be arrested, but not the forward. (D11)

The data reflect the fact that the risk is passed onto people in the lower part of the distribution structure, the couriers, who are normally young people who want to earn quick money. A high-level drug dealer explained that young people would get less severe penalties:

My youngest courier is only 13 years old. Every youngster has the same mentality: ‘I am less than 16 years old; even if I am arrested, they will only put me in a boys’ home, or under probation’. The court cannot put him in jail if he is younger than 14; he cannot even go to the Detention Centre. (D12)

Since they pass the risk onto the young people, some high-level drug dealers hire lawyers to shut the mouths of couriers when they are arrested, and advise them to seek a better option:

Our lawyer teaches them to say nothing to the police. They just don’t talk about anything when taking the statement. Our lawyer can help them modifying and preparing a good statement and provide advice on whether they can win the case. If they have the possibility of winning the case, then the lawyer will make counterpleas. If there is no such possibility, the lawyer asks them to plead guilty and say that they commit crime because of poor family background or negative peer influence. The penalty is less severe this way. (D14)

The findings, consistent with previous research (Knowles 1999; Piza and Sytsma 2016), reveal that drug bosses reduce their risk of sanctions or exposure to police by using drug runners, ensuring that they themselves avoid the scrutiny of the criminal justice system. Delegating the risk of drug dealing to those in the lower strata of the group structure is one way to mitigate the threat of punishment. Additionally, compartmentalisation within the group structure helps to guard the dealers against sanctions.

Cooperating with the police

When arrested, drug offenders cooperate with the police by confessing to their use of drugs when questioned by the authorities (Ribeiro et al. 2010). Some studies have shown that drug offenders may choose to turn themselves in to the authorities and cooperate passively to increase the likelihood of them being granted a milder sentence. Cooperating with the police may include admitting to drug use if they are arrested (Ribeiro et al. 2010). Fooling the police or passive cooperation with the police may lead to negative consequences and even to a more severe sentence. Similar norms were observed in the present study. A courier described admitting to drug use if arrested:

Our norm is not asking anything and not saying anything…If someone is arrested by the police, he will only admit to drug use by himself, but not dealing drug. He has to say the drugs are for his own use only. (D3)

A participant described her experience of a police encounter and cooperating with the police:

At one time, I had 30 ‘drops’ of coke (cocaine) with me. A police officer took me to a back alley and told me he knew I had drugs with me. He could release me but I had to return something to him. That meant I need to give him the information of ‘big’ business. After he guaranteed he would not arrest me, I gave him the information he needed. (D7)

Since low-level drug dealers can easily cooperate with or give information to the police in exchange for something advantageous, whether or not to trust your followers has become an issue in drug dealing. A crystal meth dealer highlighted this issue:

You cannot trust any person. If you choose a drug abuser who often overdoses, he becomes crazy and cannot be trusted. If my courier is arrested, it is no big deal, but he may betray us and give information to the police. If we want to find a courier, we get to know him for a few years. My boss is very cautious and always worries about the risk of being arrested. He knows me very well, so he trusts me and he knows I will not be the ghost and pin (police informant). (D5)

The drug boss’s worry is actually a real threat that always exists in the drug underworld. A cocaine dealer, who was arrested by the police and charged with drug trafficking, was interviewed before the court hearing. He described the process of being betrayed by his former partner:

I made the mistake of trusting my former partner because he is my triad brother. He was arrested and half an ounce of ketamine was seized. The policemen told him to give information about other drug dealers who processed more quantities of drugs, then they would release him. He wanted to be released and turned me in. I was unhappy, but I cannot blame anyone! I should blame myself for behaving too high-profile, to let so many people know that I am involved in the business. (D9)

Drug dealers can pass risk to their subordinates, but the risk of being betrayed is also high. Thus, the norm of not asking anything (from high-level dealers) and not saying anything (to the police) is there, with the aim of protecting everyone. However, the data suggest that it is not uncommon for low-level dealers, user-dealers and couriers to cooperate with the police in exchange for benefits for themselves.

Discussion

Certainty reduction and severity mitigation are two essential types of restrictive deterrence strategy in drug offending (Guan and Lo 2021). This study found that the restrictive deterrence strategy used by Hong Kong drug dealers corresponds well to each part of the typology: certainty reduction and severity mitigation (see Table 2). Furthermore, there are three major findings related to restrictive deterrence strategies that warrant attention: a) variations in the importance of strategies among drug dealers, b) a dual path for the transfer of restrictive deterrence strategies (strategy transfer, hereafter), and c) the role of trust in strategy transfer. These three findings are integrated into a modified framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation, as shown in Fig. 3. While the axes still represent the risk of punishment and the severity of punishment faced by drug dealers, there are four new dimensions. First, Agents A and A’ (high-level) and Agents B and B’ (low-level) refer to the different levels of drug dealers. Second, the horizontal and vertical dashed lines refer to the strategies of certainty reduction and severity mitigation. Third, the bold loop line circling the agents refers to the direct path of strategy transfer, while the bold slanting line refers to the recessive path of strategy transfer. Fourth, the trust between dealers adjusts the thickness of the loop lines and the slanting line.

Table 2 Summary of interview data
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Fig. 3
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The modified framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation

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The first finding is that, compared to high-level drug dealers (Agents A or A’), low-level drug dealers (Agents B or B’) experience a higher certainty of punishment and a lower severity of punishment. Thus, the certainty of punishment provides more deterrence to them, and, related to this, a certainty reduction strategy is of higher salience. As seen from the interview data, certainty reduction strategies are more frequently discussed by low-level drug dealers, user-dealers and couriers who have a higher chance of bumping into the police. The techniques include camouflaging themselves as lovers, drivers, pedestrians, restaurant customers and toilet users, operating in small groups, and testing new customers (Table 2). As Williams (2001: 74) noted, the “periphery is where the risks from law enforcement are greatest”. Regarding severity mitigation, the concerns of low-level drug dealers, user-dealers and couriers are more related to how to hide the drugs and, if arrested, how to cooperate with the police.

Conversely, high-level drug dealers experience a lower certainty of punishment but a higher severity of punishment; hence, the severity of the punishment deters them more, and thus the skills related to evasion (Jacobs 1996a) are of higher salience. While high-level drug dealers also use legitimate business as camouflage for their drug dealing activity, their major considerations tend to emerge in severity mitigation strategies, using such techniques as breaking the whole operation into smaller operations, using compartmentalisation, passing risks to juniors or youngsters, hiring lawyers to address post-arrest issues, and distancing themselves from the position of leader (Table 2). The variation in the importance of the strategies among drug dealers somewhat echoes the idea that offenders reach criminal maturity and professionalism when they “have skill in the execution of their crimes and in addition take many precautions to provide in advance for immunity in case they are caught” (Sutherland 1934:330).

The second finding is about strategy transfer. We found that the restrictive deterrence strategy is transferred through two paths. The first is a direct path in which restrictive deterrence is continuously transferred within the same level. For instance, the strategy is transferred from Agent A to Agent A’ (e.g., with regard to handling finance and assignments) and from Agent B to Agent B’ (e.g., with regard to dress code and hiding drugs). The compartmentalised nature of the co-offending network is enhanced when transfers take place within the same level (Fig. 3). Therefore, it is difficult for law enforcement to have more than localised effects on drug offences (Williams 2001). Additionally, strategy transfer through direct teaching ensures the timeliness and replication rate of restrictive deterrence. Moreover, a drug dealer’s direct mentoring of his subordinates is beneficial for reducing the cost of crime. Criminal mentorship efficiently reduces mentored offenders’ incarceration, so that, for example, they spend fewer days in prison (Morselli et al. 2006). Mentors directly manage their subordinates’ behaviour, thus providing structure and restraints, and form a more prudent approach to offset the negative effects of the inexperience and low self-control of frontline personnel.

The other path is a recessive one in which high-level drug dealers control low-level personnel through the use of a restrictive deterrence strategy. This path is frequently seen in relation to transferring severity mitigation strategies. As an illustration, high-level drug dealers implement a severity mitigation strategy that sets the maximum severity of punishment for low-level dealers. Correspondently, the frontline personnel commit crime based on the maximum severity of punishment already set by the high-level dealers. Take as an example the control of drug quantities: the maximum amount of drugs a courier delivers at one time depends on how much his superior gives him. A second illustration is post-arrest strategy: after a frontline employee is arrested, he may confess immediately and cooperate with the police, providing them with significant information about the leaders or drug group, and in these circumstances, a high-level dealer would hire a lawyer to communicate with the courier to help him prepare a good statement.

With the two examples illustrated above, high-level drug dealers recessively transfer their restrictive deterrence strategy to the low-level dealers through drug distribution on the upstream side and the importation of legal resources on the downstream side. This transfer path aims to ensure that high-level dealers do not have a direct connection or relationship with frontline personnel, and thus the risk of punishment fluctuates within manageable limits. This is a “defensive mechanism” (Williams 2001: 74) in the criminal network. The defensive mechanism is effectively integrated into the co-offending network so that high-end offenders shield themselves from detection within the criminal network (Williams 2001), and the effect of compartmentalisation is achieved. These mechanisms should be examined in greater detail in future research.

The third finding is that the trust among triad members plays a critical role in strategy transfer. Trust is of particular salience for a co-offence, and it has been agreed that “social relationships of all types, including risk management, rely heavily on trust” (Slovic 2000: 409). However, there are different levels of trust. Trust, a fragile and hard-to-acquire trait, is mainly created on the basis of relationships, knowledge and experience (Slovic 2000). In the present study, one major factor affecting trust and strategy transfer is the triad background. The present study confirms previous research (Chu 2000) that drug dealing in Hong Kong is predominantly triad business. All drug dealing personnel in this study, except the women, were triad members and participated in drug dealing at different levels, high, low, core member or courier (Table 1), at the various stages of triad career development. The fact that all the female participants were non-triads confirms that triad societies are male-dominated; however, females are involved because gender stereotypes make them less conspicuous when dealing in drugs on the streets (Jacobs and Miller 1998).

The study also confirms the notion of “triadisation” (Lo 2012) through which a Dai Lo (triad protector) transfers knowledge about drug dealing, norms and evasion skills to Lan Tsai (followers) quite effectively because of their protégé relationships, which facilitate the development of a criminal career. However, although triad societies have a mafia-type hierarchical structure (Lo 2012), drug dealing operates with small group sizes to maintain secrecy and avoid police penetration. This suggests that drug dealing in Hong Kong is not a mafia-structured business subject to strict organisational discipline and control; individual triads may have short-term alliances based on a mere coincidence of interests,

Against this backdrop, the present study produced a contradictory finding on the issue of trust. On the one hand, the relationships between the Dai Lo and the Lan Tsai are the basis for trust-building; on the other hand, as a kind of restrictive deterrence strategy, triads are ready to pass on risk and betray their triad brothers or junior members for their own advantage. We cannot therefore conclude that there is high trust among triad members. This is logical because drug dealing in Hong Kong, as aforesaid, is not a mafia-structured operation but is run by small triad groups. As such, there is something of a triad subculture (e.g., the Dai Lo – Lan Tsai relationship) but the discipline or organisation required by a military-like mafia organisation is lacking, echoing research on the fluid and incohesive nature of triad involvement in human smuggling (Zhang and Chin 2003).

One observation that is certainly true is that drug dealers typically only trust those they have known for years and who have experience and skills. Those who have gained the trust of their seniors are allocated important tasks, such as handling drug money, which means they are taught about the strategy of drug finance management. In contrast, those who are less trustworthy are assigned to less important tasks, such as working as couriers and peddlers. Thus, the higher the trust, the greater the strategy transfer, while the lower the trust, the higher the chance of being sacrificed.

The finding enriches our understanding of trust in Chinese triad society and the skills criminals use to establish trust or reduce risk in Chinese organised crime (e.g., Lo and Kan 2022; Varese, Wang and Wong 2019; Wang 2020; Wang, Su and Wang 2021). A comparison of the above studies is summarized in Table 3. It indicates that different kinds of skill are used in response to the specific nature of crime. Trust-based risk-reduction tactic is used when the mutual trust between criminal partners is required as in the cases of illegal money transfer and bribery involved in the selling and buying of government positions. For peer-to-peer financial fraud, trust establishment is the first step of victimization. After an individual is victimized, relational repression would be adopted to control the victim. In addition, all the four studies cited in Table 3 only focus on certainty reduction, whereas the present study focuses on both certainty reduction and severity mitigation. This echoes previous research that drug dealers receive more severe sanctions than other offenders (Gallupe et al. 2011; Harrison 2001; Spohn and Holleran 2002), and thus they are more inclined to use severity mitigation skills.

Table 3 Skills used in establishing trust and reducing risk in Chinese organized crime
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Conclusion

The investigation above is admittedly tentative. Future research would benefit from adjusting for the limitations of this study, especially given that the findings are based on interviews with those in the middle and lower levels of the drug distribution network, not from the top of the hierarchy, and thus are not taken from a highly representative sample. To conclude, drawing on the content of the interviews, the modified framework of certainty reduction – severity mitigation (Fig. 3), compared to the original framework (Fig. 2), contributes to our theoretical discussion in two aspects: (a) the addition of a strategy–group relationship mapping; (b) the depiction of strategy transfer that relies on the strategy–group relationship mapping. This mapped and hierarchical framework helps us to understand and examine the behavioural logic of the actors in the drug market. Future research should continue to recognise and explore in greater detail the role of trust in the transfer of a restrictive deterrence strategy, and should study the effect on the reduction of the cost of crime of such transfers made through different transfer paths.