Abstract
Haiti has become a scenario of convergence between the political and the criminal as a combination for territorial control and security configuration. Using process tracing, we wanted to find what were the motivations for hiring a group of mercenaries with the aim of getting rid of an increasingly authoritarian president. Thus we identify critical points in Haitian history regarding the symbiosis between crime and political institutions, which permit us to construct causal mechanisms to identify that, among other things, Haiti is a phantom state, as we call it in our research, because it has a nominal and supplanted political structure in which competition between different groups who seek to assume political authority has led to a limited, fragmented, delegated and authoritarian presence of the state among the population and the territory. Consequently, we find that the use of force has not belonged exclusively to the state, it has been divided into different oligopolies of violence and the Haitian state is only one more actor in the criminal complex of the country, where state institutions are the mechanisms with criminal organizations to generate criminal dynamics of territorial control and profit. Based on the above, we consider that, as the government of Jovenel Moïse had allied with the strongest gangs and weakened political groups and criminal rivals, the mercenaries were the instrument to break the authoritarian government of Moïse. In effect, the magnicide was the product of a plan to depose the president, undertaken by political leaders in complicity with the country’s judiciary to curb the concentration of executive power.

Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For Beach and Pedersen (2012) a sufficient and minimum explanation is that which takes into account the most important facets of the result and incorporates the eclectic mechanisms, that is, both systematic and non-systematic.
Throughout its political history, Haiti has witnessed the assassination of five sitting heads of state: Jean-Jacques Dessalines (1806), Sylvain Salnave (1870), Michel Cincinnatus Leconte (1912), Jean Vilbrum Guillaume Sam (1915) and Jovenel Moïse (2021).
On a scale of state fragility that ranges from 0 (Sustainable) to 120 (Alert), Haiti has stood out for its worrying levels, with a minimum of 97.5 (2021) and a maximum of 108 (2011) between 2006 and 2021 (Fund for Peace).
In the last electoral year, 2015, the homicide rate was 10 per 100,000 inhabitants (Buró Regional para América Latina y el Caribe del Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) 2020).
This criminal organization emerged in 2018 after protests by the police officers’ union demanding better pay and working conditions. The union later dissociated itself from the violent actions of the organization (Asmann 2021a).
The following gangs are part of the G9: Baz Krache Dife, Baz Pilate, Nan Ti Bwa, Simon Pelé, Baz Nan Chabon, Waf Jérémie, Nan Boston and Belekou (InSight Crime 2021b).
The two Haitians involved in the plot are Joseph Félix Badio, a former anti-corruption official at the Ministry of Justice, and John Jöel Joseph, a senator from the opposition Inité party (Beaumont 2021). According to information provided by one of the captured mercenaries, it was Badio who ordered the assassination of the president.
No member of the president’s guard was injured or killed. During the interrogation of the mercenaries by the Haitian authorities, it was established that the guards simply surrendered (Noticias Caracol 2021). Currently the head of the presidential guard and 12 members of the security corps are in prison on suspicion of having participated in the plot.
Former judge Windelle Coq Thelot was fired and charged for allegedly participating in an attempted coup. She met Emmanuel Sanon, the first hopeful to succeed Moïse. However, Sanon’s low popularity paved the way for the former judge to be the candidate to take office after Moïse’s overthrow. According to the mercenaries, her code name was “Diamond” (Noticias Caracol 2021).
According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, by 2020 Haiti was classified as a moderate autocracy with weak governance (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2021).
References
Antonin A (2019) Radiografía de la crisis haitiana. In: Nueva Soc. https://nuso.org/articulo/crisis-haiti-moise/
Asmann P (2021a) Descontento en la Policía siembra mayor agitación en Haití. In: InSight Crime
Asmann P(2020) Alianza de pandillas G9 en Haití, ¿una bomba de tiempo? In:InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/pandillas-g9-haiti-bomba-tiempo/
Asmann P(2021b) ¿Hubo participación del crimen organizado en el asesinato del presidente de Haití? In:InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/participacion-crimen-organizado-asesinato-presidente-haiti/
Asmann P, Jones K (2021) Balance de InSight Crime de los homicidios en 2020. In: InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/balance-insight-crime-homicidios-2020/
Badillo R, Mijares VM (2021) Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America. Glob Crime 22:312–335
Baranyi S (2012) Contested Statehood and State-building in Haití. Rev Cienc Política 32:723–738
Barnes N (2022) The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control: Military Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Comp Polit Stud 55:789–831. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211036035
Beach D, Pedersen R (2012) Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
Beaumont P (2021) Ex-senator among three new suspects after murder of Haiti president. In: Guard. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/14/haiti-authorities-seek-three-more-people-killing-of-president-jovenel-moise
Becker DC (2011) Gangs, Netwar, and” Community Counterinsurgency” in Haiti. Prism 2:137–154
Bennett A, Checkel JT (2015) Process tracing. In: Bennett A, Checkel JT (eds) Process Tracing. From Methapor to Analytical Tool. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 3–38
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2021) Latin America and the Caribbean. Divisions growing, consensus eroding
Blattman C, Duncan G, Lessing B, Tobón S (2021) Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance. National Bureau of Economic Research
Buró Regional para América Latina y el Caribe del Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) (2020) Evolución de la tasas de homicidios en Latinoamérica por cada 100 mil habitantes. In: InfoSegura. https://infosegura.org/2021/01/20/homicidios-en-el-ano-del-covid-19-centroamerica-y-republica-dominicana/#
Buss TF (2015) Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in H aiti from 1957 to 2015. Lat Am Policy 6:319–339
Chandler D (2006) Empire in denial: the politics of state-building. Pluto Press, London
Clavel T (2017) Restablecimiento de ejército en Haití. puede plantear más riesgos de seguridad que soluciones
Cockayne J (2009) Winning Haiti’s protection competition: organized crime and peace operations past, present and future. Int Peacekeeping 16:77–99
Cockayne J (2014) The futility of force? Strategic lessons for dealing with unconventional armed groups from the UN’s war on Haiti’s gangs. J Strateg Stud 37:736–769
Cruz JM (2016) State and criminal violence in Latin America. Crime Law Soc Chang 66:375–396. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9631-9
Deibert M(2015) Could the gangs of Port-au-Prince form a pact to revitalise Haiti’s capital? Guard
Esperance P (2019) Written Testimony of Pierre Esperance. Executive Director Haitian National Human Rights Defense Network
Ferreira MA, Richmond OP (2021) Blockages to Peace Formation in Latin America: The Role of Criminal Governance. J Interv Statebuilding 15:161–180. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2021.1878337
Francisque J(2021) Haití: el gobierno de las pandillas
Frankema E, Masé A (2014) An island drifting apart. Why Haiti is mired in poverty while the Dominican Republic forges ahead. J Int Dev 26:128–148
Fund for Peace Haití -Country Dashboard. In: Fragile States Index. https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/. Accessed 4 Sep 2021
García J(2021) Jovenel Möise: un presidente rodeado de enemigos. El País
Gros J-G (1996) Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti. Third World Q 17:455–472
Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (2021) Killing with Impunity. Observatoire Haïtien des Crimes Contre L’humanité. State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti
Hurbon L (2021) Haití: deriva autoritaria y Estado mafioso. Nueva Soc
InSight C(2021a) G9 y Familia
InSight C(2021b) G9 y Familia. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-crimen-organizado-caribe/g9-familia/#:~:text=La “G9 y Familia” (,Puerto Príncipe%2 C la capital haitiana
International Crisis Group (2021) Haití: un camino hacia la estabilidad para una nación en shock. Bogota, Nueva York y Bruselas
John T(2021) Slain Haitian president faced calls for resignation, sustained mass protests before killing. In: Conversat. https://theconversation.com/slain-haitian-president-faced-calls-for-resignation-sustained-mass-protests-before-killing-164131. Accessed 19 Sep 2021
Kolbe AR (2020) Prospects for Post-Minustah Security in Haiti. Int Peacekeeping 27:44–57
La Nación (2021) Magnicidio en Haití: ¿Lo mataron sus guardias? Las dos hipótesis sobre el papel de exmilitares colombianos en el asesinato de Jovenel Moïse
La Razón (2021) La larga lista de enemigos del presidente de Haití Jovenel Moïse
Leander A (2002) Global Ungovernance. Mercenaries, States and the Control over Violence
Legvold R (2009) Corruption, the Criminalized State, and Post-Soviet Transitions. In: Rotberg RI (ed) Corruption, global security, and world order. Brookings Institution Press, Baltimore, pp 194–238
Lemay-Hébert N (2014) Resistance in the time of cholera: The limits of stabilization through securitization in Haiti. Int Peacekeeping 21:198–213
Lessing B (2020) Conceptualizing criminal governance. Perspect Polit 19:854–873
Lessing B, Graham W (2019) Legitimacy in Criminal Governance: Managing a Drug Empire from Behind Bars. Am Polit Sci Rev 113:584–606. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000928
Mahoney J (2007) Qualitative methodology and comparative politics. Comp Polit Stud 40:122–144
Manigat S(2021) Haití: entre vientos de cambio y ruido de botas. Nueva Soc
Manjarrés J(2021) Jefe pandillero de Haití defiende la memoria del presidente asesinado. In: InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/jefe-pandillero-haiti-defiende-memoria-presidente-asesinado/
Ministerio de Gobierno del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2021) Ex ministro Fernando López planificó magnicidio con mercenarios y paramilitares contra Luis Arce. https://www.mingobierno.gob.bo/lun-18102021-0815ex-ministro-fernando-lopez-planifico-magnicidio-mercenarios-paramilitares-contra-luis-arce
Moreno Segura L(2017)¿Haití sin la ONU? Nueva Soc
Nicholls D (1986) Haiti: The rise and fall of Duvalierism. Third World Q 8:1239–1252
Niño C, González C Moïse, magnicidio y mercenarios. In: Foreign Aff. Latinoamérica(2021) https://revistafal.com/moise-magnicidio-y-mercenarios/
Noticias Caracol (2021) Así mataron al presidente de Haití: mercenarios colombianos confiesan cómo fue el magnicidio
Olivier D (2021) The Political Anatomy of Haiti’s Armed Gangs: In Port-au-Prince, botched NGO and military inventions have fragmented urban space, triggering an explosive proliferation of violent armed groups. NACLA Rep Am 53:83–87
Radio Francia Internacional (2021) El asesinato del presidente ‘no pudo pasar sin que su fuerza de seguridad esté en una conspiración’. https://www.rfi.fr/es/américas/20210707-el-asesinato-del-presidente-no-pudo-pasar-sin-que-su-fuerza-de-seguridad-esté-en-una-conspiración. Accessed 11 Jan 2021
Ramachandran V, Walz J (2015) Haiti: where has all the money gone? J Haitian Stud 21:26–65
RNDDH (2020) Attaques contre des quartiers défavorisés: Le RNDDH exige la fin de la protection des gangs armés par les autorités au pouvoir. https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/7-Rap-Attaque-Quartier-Defavorise-23Jun2020-3.pdf
Schuberth M (2015) A transformation from political to criminal violence? Politics, organised crime and the shifting functions of Haiti’s urban armed groups. Confl Secur Dev 15:169–196
Schuberth M (2018) Security blurs in Haiti: Urban armed groups as providers of (in) security. In: Security Blurs. Routledge, pp 33–49
Schultze-kraft M (2016) Órdenes crimilegales: repensando el poder político del crimen organizado. Iconos Rev Ciencias Soc 25–44. https://doi.org/10.17141/iconos.55.2016.1899
Serrano Caballero E (2007) Las operaciones para el mantenimiento de la paz en Haití (1991–2005). Desafios 16:180–215
Snyder R (2002) Vías de salida de los regímenes sultánicos: Una combinación de perspectivas estructurales y voluntaristas. Araucaria Rev Iberoam Filos Política. Humanidades y Relac Int 4
Snyder R, Durán-Martínez A(2009) Drugs, violence, and state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico and Colombia.Colomb Int61–91
Somer M, McCoy JL, Luke RE(2021) Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies.Democratization1–20
Swissinfo(2021) Parlamento dice que plan de ataque ‘Gedeón’ contra Venezuela está comprobado. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/venezuela-crisis_parlamento-dice-que-plan-de-ataque--gedeón--contra-venezuela-está-comprobado/46587420
Taulbee JL, Head DA (1993) Mercenary commando coup operations: Theory versus practice. J Strateg Stud 16:109–121
Trouillot M-R (1990) Haiti: State against nation. The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism. Monthly Review Press, New York
Unidad Investigativa (2021) Haití: ecuatoriano dice que financió cambio de mando, no asesinato. El Tiempo
Valdés JG (2008) La Minustah y la reconstrucción del Estado haitiano. Estud Int 40:129–142
Wilson M(2021) Gasolina, agua, asistencia internacional: pandillas de Haití explotan servicios esenciales. In: InSight Crime. https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/gasolina-agua-asistencia-internacional-pandillas-haiti-explotan-servicios-esenciales/. Accessed 11 May 2021
Wyss J(2021) Gangs Now Run Haiti, Filling a Vacuum Left by Years of Collapse. In: Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-02/gangs-now-run-haiti-filling-a-vacuum-left-by-years-of-collapse
Zanotti L (2010) Cacophonies of aid, failed state building and NGOs in Haiti: setting the stage for disaster, envisioning the future. Third World Q 31:755–771
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding authors
Ethics declarations
Research involving human participants and/or animals
The research did not involve human or animal participants.
Informed consent
This study did not involve human participants, animals, or their data or biological material, and as such, consent was not required.
Conflict of interest
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Niño, C., González, C. Phantom state in Haiti: criminal sovereignty and the mercenary remedy. Trends Organ Crim (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09460-3
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-022-09460-3