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Accounting for turbulence in the Colombian underworld

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A Correction to this article was published on 17 March 2018

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Abstract

Organized crime groups (OCGs) fight against each other even if it harms their businesses and exposes them to law enforcement authorities. Why do some groups refrain from fighting, while others operate in the incessantly violent underworld? To explain this puzzle, we propose that the underworld conflict is related to the strategies of extra-legal governance adopted by OCGs. We suggest that such strategies have origins in the availability of resources within the groups reach at their entrance into the underworld. More specifically, OCGs with access to easily extractable resources develop limited governance, which leaves them vulnerable to internal and external challenges. OCGs without access to easily extractable resources invest in extended governance, reducing their risk of underworld conflict. This article illustrates this hypothesis in the comparative case study of the Colombian organized crime, supported by new quantitative data.

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Change history

  • 17 March 2018

    The original version of this article contained a typesetting mistake. Map 1 image was incorrect. The original article has been corrected.

Notes

  1. For convenience, we will refer to the group as the Centauros, adding its later name (ERPAC) only in few specific instances.

  2. Usually, the reduction of violence (or its promise) strengthens criminals’ position in the negotiations with the authorities (Rozema 2008: 450). Interestingly, in some cases, it is the escalation of violence that increases criminals’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the authorities (Lessing 2015).

  3. We recognize, along with Rios (2013), that distinction between endogenous and exogenous origins of underworld violence is analytically and empirically blurred. To illustrate, an apparently exogenous police crackdown that triggers turf wars may in fact be a response to prior (endogenous) escalation of violence among competing criminals.

  4. Following Varese (2014, 2010), we understand governance as a service of establishing “good order and workable arrangements” that regulate social and economic exchange.

  5. Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (Unsatisfied Basic Needs).

  6. One could argue that even after 2003 the distinction between the paramilitaries and OCGs remained blurred, as new OCGs recruited many former paramilitary soldiers. One important change occurred, though. Post-2003 OCGs practically abandoned counterinsurgency activities and rarely resorted to anti-subversive rhetoric (if not for propaganda purposes). As a result, they fought against insurgents and exercised political pressures only insofar as it allowed them to further their purely criminal interests, such as drug-trafficking and exploitation of natural resources (see Medina 2015: 25; Massé 2015; CNNR 2007).

  7. The decision to allow these groups to participate in the demobilization process provoked strong criticism from human rights advocates (HRW 2010).

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for feedback from Luciano Brancaccio, Francesco Strazzari, Giovanni Zanoletti, Roberto González, Luis Trejos, and the two anonymous reviewers. Additionally, we would like to thank Ionie Britton for help in editing the manuscript. This study was funded by the Department of Social Science, Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50014, San Domenico di Fiesole, FI, Italy

    Krzysztof Krakowski

  2. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla, Colombia

    Gladys Zubiría

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  1. Krzysztof Krakowski
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  2. Gladys Zubiría
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Krzysztof Krakowski contributed to the article by designing the research, collecting and analyzing the data, and writing up the manuscript. Krzysztof Krakowski and Gladys Zubiría contributed together by developing the theory.

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Correspondence to Krzysztof Krakowski.

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The original version of this article was revised: Map 1 image was incorrect.

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Krakowski, K., Zubiría, G. Accounting for turbulence in the Colombian underworld. Trends Organ Crim 22, 166–186 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-9330-2

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