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The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization

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Abstract

Kingpin strategies— the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drug trafficking organization hierarchies— has become a centerpiece of US and Mexican efforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequences of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of Arellano Felix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990’s to 2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO “lieutenants” increased kidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization “kingpins” did not result in increased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fill leadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of “kingpins” did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide and kidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide rates dropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use of kidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuana consumer drug market.

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Notes

  1. The author would like to thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, which funded 9 months of fieldwork in Mexico; the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, which funded preliminary research trips; and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, where much of the editing of this project was completed.

  2. Before El Teo’s arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police always travelled in groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automatic weapons. Motorcycle police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three. Seven months after Teo’s January 2010 arrest, Police appeared calmer and rode in their trucks with one partner in the cab with them and no one in the truck bed. This is evidence of the impact that Teo’s arrest had on the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009).

  3. Voluntary and anonymous surveys conducted regularly throughout Mexico might help to provide a more accurate picture of the kidnapping problem than reports based on statistics provided by law enforcement institutions that lack the faith of the populace. Indeed, websites like www.notecalles.org.mx appear to attempt to address this issue in this fashion by allowing Mexican citizens to self-report crime anonymously (No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad 2010).

  4. This argument posits that certain factions of the organization became profit-starved while others may have continued to thrive. The profit-starved factions began to focus on the taxation of territory and the expansion into “high impact” crime like kidnapping and extortion. This was especially true in the internecine conflict period where the enforcers of the Teo faction attempted to take control of the territory and network. Thus, the argument is not dependent upon a commensurate reduction in drug trafficking, which might be measured or correlated with a reduction in confiscated drugs at the border. Rather drug confiscations at the border would represent an irrelevant variable because another portion of the illicit network continued to traffic.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee members Professors Caesar Sereseres, Etel Solingen, Kamal Sadiq and Louis Desipio. I would also like to thank Steve Duncan of the California Department of Justice for opening important doors for me in the course of my research on the AFO. Finally, I would like to thank the Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) and the UC Irvine Department of Political Science for funding various phases of research on which this analysis is based.

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Correspondence to Nathan Jones.

Appendices

Appendix

Data

ICESI annual kidnap data

1997

28

1

1998

72

3

1999

23

1

2000

47

2

2001

25

1

2002

22

1

2003

20

1

2004

9

0

2005

9

0

2006

38

1

2007

20

1

2008

115

4

2009

103

3

2010

79

2

2011

64

 

ICESI Baja/National Kidnap Rates

Year

Kidnap Rate Baja California

Kidnap Rate National

1997

1

1

1998

3

1

1999

1

1

2000

2

1

2001

1

1

2002

1

0

2003

1

0

2004

0

0

2005

0

0

2006

1

1

2007

1

0

2008

4

1

2009

3

1.1

2010

2

1.1

Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) data on homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana.

 

Homicides - Tijuana

Kidnappings Tijuana

Extortions in Tijuana

2006-1-January

25

3

10

2006-2 -February

27

3

5

2006-3-march

20

1

4

2006-4-april

26

3

5

2006-5-may

27

4

10

2006-6-june

28

1

23

2006-7-july

25

5

17

2006-8-august

29

3

21

2006-9-September

32

0

23

2006-10-october

26

3

20

2006-11-november

23

1

7

2006-12-December

26

3

19

2007-1-January

22

0

13

2007-2 -February

27

0

19

2007-3-march

24

2

12

2007-4-april

25

2

5

2007-5-may

22

1

7

2007-6-june

32

0

7

2007-7-july

22

4

7

2007-8-august

27

1

7

2007-9-September

24

0

11

2007-10-october

23

1

6

2007-11-november

38

2

8

2007-12-December

24

1

6

2008-1-January

30

11

5

2008-2 -February

33

11

7

2008-3-march

48

10

11

2008-4-april

42

10

10

2008-5-may

21

5

17

2008-6-june

33

3

29

2008-7-july

28

5

14

2008-8-august

29

5

4

2008-9-September

32

7

11

2008-10-october

87

7

23

2008-11-november

123

16

19

2008-12-December

71

2

17

2009-1-January

56

7

14

2009-2 -February

36

9

14

2009-3-march

47

12

21

2009-4-april

38

7

9

2009-5-may

43

15

9

2009-6-june

31

3

9

2009-7-july

41

3

9

2009-8-august

51

5

18

2009-9-September

45

5

26

2009-10-october

32

5

17

2009-11-november

38

12

22

2009-12-December

98

12

18

2010-1-January

99

9

19

2010-2 -February

51

3

19

2010-3-march

57

4

23

2010-4-april

54

5

25

2010-5-may

50

6

25

2010-6-june

44

6

22

2010-7-july

52

6

20

2010-8-august

45

9

16

2010-9-September

58

5

21

2010-10-october

50

3

14

2010-11-november

69

7

13

2010-12-December

59

5

15

2011-1-January

51

4

18

2011-2-February

27

11

13

2011-3-March

45

4

9

2011-4-April

28

4

16

2011-5-May

42

4

6

2011-6-June

41

5

8

2011-7-July

35

1

14

2011-8-August

38

0

11

2011-9-September

33

6

14

Oct-11

28

4

12

Nov-11

24

1

11

Dec-11

26

1

19

Jan-12

39

1

19

Feb-12

22

0

26

Mar-12

24

1

16

Apr-12

26

0

12

May-12

27

1

14

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Jones, N. The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies: kidnap rates and the Arellano-Félix Organization. Trends Organ Crim 16, 156–176 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x

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