Abstract
In this essay, I argue that it is a mistake to deny the existence of psychological harms or that such harms may justify limiting certain sorts of speech acts in certain sorts of circumstances, but that suchcircumstances are not part of the paradigmatic college environment. I begin by providing examples of recent inappropriate limits to speech on college campuses and explaining Frank Furedi’s 2011 analysis of the situation. Partially in contrast to Furedi, I indicate that while demands to prohibit all speech acts that bother listeners must be rejected, some speech causes real psychological harm and can be rightly limited. I proceed to argue that harm—physical, psychological, or other—is the only thing we should accept as justifying interference with individual behavior, invoking John Stuart Mill’s famous harm principle as well as analysis by Joel Feinberg. I show that speech can be harmful in various ways and discuss when and why certain speech acts might reasonably be prohibited if we take Mill’s principle seriously. In the final sections, I indicate why extensive free speech is essential to college environments and show that some speech that might be harmful elsewhere will not be harmful on college campuses. Even when there are some, fairly minimal, harms due to speech on campus, prohibition will often not be permissible. Finally, I address a real concern that college students, like the rest of us, are entitled to their own home spaces safe from speech they find hurtful, but indicate that those spaces are their dorm rooms.
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Notes
See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/opinion/smothering-speech-at-middlebury.html. Fortunately, there has been something of a backlash against this sort of anti-speech activity. Indeed, dozens of professors at Middlebury signed a free speech statement; see https://freeinquiryblog.wordpress.com/.
Frank Furedi, On Tolerance: A Defence of Moral Independence (London: Continuum Books, 2011): 100.
Ibid, 106 and 106–107.
Ibid, 117.
John Stuart Mill. On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978), 9.
For “harming as right violating,” see Feinberg Harm to Others (NY: Oxford University Press, 1984), 109–114.
This view is best defended in Joel Feinberg’s four-volume magnum opus The Moral Limits to the Criminal Law. See, e.g., his 1984, op cit). I also defend it in my Toleration (NY: Polity, 2014).
Throughout, really, this should be “one person or group of persons.”
Determining when there is wrongfulness is difficult, but I set that aside here.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Illinois Supreme Court decision allowing the members of the National Socialist Party of America to march. (Perhaps mistakenly, according to the view defended here. The Nazis could, of course, have marched elsewhere.) To be clear, having a reason to interfere does not mean having a decisive reason to interfere. As already noted, there may be a countervailing reason that is weightier. The harm principle provides a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for interference.
This is true of physical acts as well.
This according to the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study (see www.acestudy.org),
Case law generally requires viewpoint neutrality when asking if speech can be limited. The idea is that the state should not interfere with speech based on its content. My view accepts this. It is not the evil of the Nazi viewpoint—symbolized in the swastika those wishing to march in Skokie would have worn—that makes interference permissible on my view. It is, rather, the harm the symbolic statement would make in that situation. (This is why context matters, as indicated above.)
Sometimes students may seek to shut down speech because they think it or the speaker is harmful to others. That is, their concern may not be with their own welfare but with that of others. In such cases, I would suggest, dialoging with the speaker is likely the better solution.
Op cit, 56 and 58.
Mill also argues, correctly in my view, that by encouraging scrutiny of one’s beliefs, freedom of speech leads us to be justified in our beliefs and leads us to uncover truth.
Some will worry that this makes impossible groups dedicated to particular religious or ideological views. If the Catholic (or Libertarian) Student Organization, for example, must allow non-Catholic (or non-Libertarian) students to speak against Catholicism (or Libertarianism) at their meetings, the group may think its purpose negated. For my part, as long as those that attend such meetings to bring a dissenting viewpoint do so respectfully, I remain unconcerned. Of course, if the group finds even respectful dissent unacceptable, they could have informal meetings in their dorm rooms or off campus. Respectful dissent, though, is fully compatible with teaching and learning so even if the point is to learn more about the religious or ideological view at hand, there should be no problem.
He wishes to thank Chris Surprenant, Tom Cushman, and the Institute for Humane Studies for putting together a workshop about free speech on campus where these ideas crystalized. Thanks also to Chris and Daniel Shapiro for comments on a draft of this article.
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Cohen, A.J. Psychological Harm and Free Speech on Campus. Soc 54, 320–325 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0145-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0145-6