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Society

, Volume 54, Issue 3, pp 253–260 | Cite as

Professional Identity and Dishonest Behavior

  • Petr Houdek
Social Science and Public Policy

Abstract

This essay discusses the fraud triangle, or how factors such as opportunity to cheat, motivation to cheat or ability to rationalize or justify dishonest behavior lead to dishonesty. The fraud triangle is applied on behavior of professionals active in fields such as medicine, education, research and science or clergy. Evidence shows that even in these fields, which attract more altruistic individuals, the fraud triangle factors predicts emergence of behavior in breach of ethical standards. In the conclusion several measures for reducing dishonesty are discussed. Disciplines such as forensic economics or behavioral ethics are emphasized to provide wider variety of tools to detect and reduce dishonest behavior.

Keywords

Dishonesty Fraud triangle Teachers Academics Researchers Physicians Clergy Ethics 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Business AdministrationUniversity of Economics in PraguePragueCzech Republic

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