Abstract
Discussions of whether American primacy will continue focus unduly on specific power differences between the United States and its Asian rivals. Appraisals should also consider institutional capacities. Western regimes have large advantages rooted in cultural differences. Individualism generates stronger economies and governments than the more collective worldviews of the non-West. America will continue to lead mainly because of its far greater willingness to take responsibility for world problems.
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Mead, L.M. The Primacy Contest: Why Culture Matters. Soc 52, 527–532 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-015-9943-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-015-9943-x