Human Nature

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 191–208 | Cite as

Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village

Article

Abstract

Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT’s free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents’ contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results.

Key words

Collective action Cooperation Costly signaling theory Mutual monitoring Public goods Punishment Prestige Reciprocal altruism Reciprocity Reputation Reward Status 

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Copyright information

© Walter de Gruyter, Inc 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Evolutionary Psychology, Department of AnthropologyUniversity of CaliforniaSanta Barbara

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