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Profit allocation among rational players in a cooperative game under uncertainty

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Abstract

In this paper, a cooperative game has been considered, where there is a coalition between rational players in an uncertain environment. The uncertainty occurs in terms of the quality of the raw material. The pay-offs of the players are influenced by the degree of satisfaction. Pay-offs are considered as interval numbers. A multisection technique has been applied to obtain a rational solution. In the process, it has been found that the degree of satisfaction of the rational players converges to its optimum value with the convergence of the iterations. A comparative study has been made with methods existing in the literature.

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Correspondence to PRASUN KUMAR NAYAK.

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BANDYOPADHYAY, S., RAHA, S. & NAYAK, P.K. Profit allocation among rational players in a cooperative game under uncertainty. Sadhana 40, 1077–1089 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-015-0374-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-015-0374-6

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