, 33:131 | Cite as

Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results

  • Dinesh Garg
  • Y. NarahariEmail author
  • Sujit Gujar


Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design (Garg et al 2008), we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory.


Mechanism design game theory social choice functions auctions 


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Copyright information

© Indian Academy of Sciences 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IBM India Research LaboratoryBangaloreIndia
  2. 2.Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and AutomationIndian Institute of ScienceBangaloreIndia

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