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The powers of national regulatory authorities as agents of EU law

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Abstract

Over the past few decades, National Regulatory Authorities have acquired a central role in the implementation of EU law. NRAs are established by the Member States, implying that they are part of the national administrative organisation chart. Their creation, however, is compulsory under EU law. Today’s NRAs derive most of their competences from EU legislation, even if the formal legal basis of their tasks and powers is typically the national legislation that implements the EU directives. Focusing on NRAs in the field of network regulation, which are characterised by the far-reaching requirements of (political) independence that EU law imposes, this paper maps this trend of ‘empowering’ NRAs and some of the challenges on the level of accountability that go hand in hand with it.

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Notes

  1. Some legislation uses the term ‘national supervisory authority’: see e.g. Art. 4 of Regulation 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of a single European sky (the framework regulation) [2004] OJ L 96/1.

  2. Nicolaïdes [15], p. 29.

  3. Another type of national supervisory authorities subject to such independence requirements are the data protection authorities. See Art. 52–54 Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. These provisions were to an important extent inspired by the case law of the CJEU on the notion of ‘complete independence’ that was anchored in Art. 28 of the Data Protection Directive. See Case C-518/07 Commission/Germany, EU:C:2010:125; Case C-614/10 Commission/Austria, EU:C:2012:631; Case C-288/12 Commission/Hungary, EU:C:2014:237.

  4. Case C-82/07 Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones, EU:C:2008:143, para. 24; Case C-389/08 Base NV and Others v Ministerraad [2010] ECR I-9073; Case C-85/14 KPN BV, EU:C:2015:610.

  5. References to EU legislation should be read as references to the consolidated text, as amended by later legislation.

  6. Art. 35 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L 211/5; Art. 39 of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L 211/94; Art. 55 Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area [2012] OJ L 343/32.

  7. Art. 3(3a) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/33.

  8. See Art. 22 of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service [1998] OJ L 15/14.

  9. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, COM/2016/0287.

  10. Art. 55(2) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  11. Case C-424/15 Xabier Ormaetxea Garai and Bernardo Lorenzo Almendros, EU:C:2016:780.

  12. https://www.acm.nl/en/.

  13. https://www.arcep.fr/.

  14. http://www.bipt.be/en.

  15. Art. 56 of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  16. Art. 36 and 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC; Arts. 40 and 41 of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  17. Halberstam [6], p. 189.

  18. See e.g. Case C-424/07 Commission v Germany, EU:C:2009:749.

  19. Lavrijssen/Ottow [12], p. 95; Aelen [1], pp. 249–254; Ziller [25], pp. 901–906.

  20. Belgian Constitutional Court 7 August 2013, no. 117/2013.

  21. Belgian Constitutional Court 25 May 2016, no. 71/2016.

  22. Lavrijssen/Ottow [11], p. 431; Ottow [17], p. 143 ff.

  23. De Somer [4], pp. 223–250.

  24. Art. 56(8) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  25. Art. 37(5)(g) of Directive /EC.

  26. Art. 3(3) of Directive 97/67/EC.

  27. On the extent of this power, see Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas—The Regulatory Authorities, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010_01_21_the_regulatory_authorities.pdf, pp. 13–14.

  28. Art. 37(1)(a) and (h) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(1)(a) and (h) of Directive 2009/73.

  29. Art. 37(5)(e) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(5)(e) of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  30. Art. 20 of Directive 2002/21/EC.

  31. Art. 37(5)(c) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(5)(c) of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  32. Art. 56(1) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  33. Art. 56(9) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  34. Art. 37(4)(d) of Directive 2009/72/EC. A parallel provision is found in the Gas Directive: Art. 41(4)(d) of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  35. See Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas—The Regulatory Authorities, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010_01_21_the_regulatory_authorities.pdf, p. 18.

  36. See e.g. Prosser [20], p. 317; Harlow/Rawlings [7], p. 284.

  37. CC, déc. 2013-331 QPC du 5 juillet 2013, para. 12; CC, déc. 2013-359 QPC du 13 décembre 2013, para. 6.

  38. See e.g. Van den Bergh [23], p. 183.

  39. Nicolaïdes [15], p. 28.

  40. On the risk of possible conflicts of competences or regulatory inconsistencies, see Petit [19]. The liberalisation directives increasingly address the relationship between NRAs and NCA, mostly by imposing duties of mutual information and cooperation: see e.g. Art. 22 Directive 97/67/EC; Art. 3(5) of Directive 2002/21/EC; Art. 37(1)(k) and (o) and Art. 37(4)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

  41. See Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas—The Regulatory Authorities, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010_01_21_the_regulatory_authorities.pdf, pp. 12 and 17: Member States may give the NRA additional duties and powers to those specified in the directives. There seems to be no reason why this would not also be the case in the other network industries.

  42. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, COM/2017/0063.

  43. They typically do remain subject to general forms of parliamentary oversight, meaning, for instance, that they submit annual reports to their national parliaments.

  44. See De Somer [4], pp. 251–267.

  45. Another important aspect is NRAs’ financial accountability. Member States can make their NRAs’ subject to general legislation concerning public finances and to specific provisions regarding the control and rationalisation of expenses of government services: Case C-240/15 Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, EU:C:2016:608.

  46. E.g. Art. 6 of Directive 2002/21/EC; Art. 37(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(2) of Directive 2009/73/EC; Art. 56(7) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  47. E.g. Art. 37(16) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(16) of Directive 2009/73/EC; Art. 56(11) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  48. Vegter/Maandag [24], p. 214.

  49. See Art. 51.

  50. This follows from Art. 41(1) of the Charter. See also Case C-482/10 Teresa Cicala, EU:C:2011:868, para. 28; Kańska [9], p. 309.

  51. Kristjánsdóttir [10], pp. 248–252; Hofmann/Mihaescu [8], pp. 73–101.

  52. There is some debate on whether and to what extent decisions on tariffs are normative acts, but they are mostly treated as such.

  53. Court of Appeal of Brussels 6 February 2013, 2012/AR/205, 2012/AR/2017 conn. 2012/AR/220.

  54. See De Somer/Opdebeek [3], pp. 111–112.

  55. Art. 56(2) of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  56. Art. 37(17) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(16) of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  57. Art. 4 of Directive 2002/21/EC.

  58. Art. 22(3) Directive 97/67/EC.

  59. Taton [22], p. 180 ff. For NRAs responsible for the energy markets, some guidance is found in Commission Staff Working Paper 22 January 2010, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas—The Regulatory Authorities, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010_01_21_the_regulatory_authorities.pdf, pp. 19–20.

  60. Case C-282/13 T-Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2015:24.

  61. Case C-426/05 Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH, EU:C:2008:103.

  62. Para. 36.

  63. Para. 39.

  64. Case C-231/15 Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Petrotel sp. z o.o. w Płocku, EU:C:2016:769.

  65. Para. 20 with reference to Case C-282/13 T-Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2015:24, para. 33.

  66. Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities [2002] OJ L 108/7.

  67. Case C-28/15 Koninklijke KPN NV et al., EU:C:2016:692.

  68. Para. 59.

  69. Haguenau-Moizard and Sanchez [5], p. 157.

  70. Mak [14], pp. 301–319.

  71. Ottow [16], p. 18.

  72. Baldwin/Cave/Lodge [2], p. 345.

  73. See e.g. Rawlings [21], pp. 281, 291–292 and 304.

  74. See e.g. an example from Belgium: Court of Appeal of Brussels 6 February 2013, 2012/AR/205, 2012/AR/2017 conn. 2012/AR/220. The Court ascertained that the Belgian federal energy regulator had neither in the decision itself (as a part of a statement of reasons), nor in its written proceedings before the court, demonstrated that the decision under scrutiny (a tariff decision) complied with the general objective anchored in Article 36(d) of Directive 2009/72 (‘helping to achieve, in the most cost-effective way, the development of secure, reliable and efficient non-discriminatory systems that are consumer oriented’). Hence, the relevant provisions in the decision were found to be unlawful.

  75. Case C-55/06 Arcor AG & Co. KG, EU:C:2008:244, paras. 188–191.

  76. E.g. Art. 22(2) of Directive 97/67/EC; Art. 7(2) of Directive 2002/21/EC; Art. 37(1)(c) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 41(1)(c) of Directive 2009/73/EC; Art. 57 of Directive 2012/34/EU.

  77. E.g. Maggetti [13]; Papadopoulos [18], p. 477.

  78. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal market for electricity, COM/2016/0379, pp. 6–7.

  79. See Art. 7(4)-(5) Directive 2002/21/EC; Art. 39(5)-(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC; Art. 43(5)-(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC.

  80. De Somer [4], p. 270 ff.

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    Stéphanie De Somer

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De Somer, S. The powers of national regulatory authorities as agents of EU law. ERA Forum 18, 581–595 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-017-0487-y

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