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Individual and regional determinants of receiving unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the individual and regional determinants of unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany. On the basis of an administrative data set a multilevel hazard rate model in discrete time for the transitions into a sanction is estimated, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity on the individual and regional level. It is shown that certain benefit recipients, e.g. younger people, are more likely to receive sanctions than e.g. older, disabled, or skilled individuals. Moreover, the risk of being sanctioned not only depends on individual characteristics but is also influenced by the sanction policies of the employment agencies.

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag untersucht individuelle und regionale Determinanten von Sanktionen, die Unterstützungsleistungen arbeitsloser Leistungsempfänger in Deutschland mindern. Auf Basis von Geschäftsdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit wird ein multivariates Abgangsratenmodell für die Übergänge in eine Sanktion in diskreter Zeit spezifiziert, das unbeobachtete Heterogenität auf individueller und regionaler Ebene kontrolliert. Das individuelle Sanktionsrisiko ist neben individuellen Merkmalen und dem Verhalten des Arbeitslosen von der Sanktionierungsintensität der regionalen Arbeitsagenturen abhängig.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. DIW, German Institute for Economic Research, Mohrenstr. 58, 10117, Berlin, Deutschland

    Kai-Uwe Müller

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  1. Kai-Uwe Müller
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Correspondence to Kai-Uwe Müller.

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J64, J65, J68

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Müller, KU. Individual and regional determinants of receiving unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany . Wirt Sozialstat Archiv 1, 275–286 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11943-007-0022-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11943-007-0022-7

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