Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

How Terrorism Red Flags Become Weak Signals Through the Processes of Judgement and Evaluation

  • Published:
Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of why, in spite of their characteristics as ‘strong signals’, terrorism red flags can sometimes be missed. This represents a serious problem for counter-terrorism. By analysing the two phases of the investigative decision-making process, judgement and evaluation, we explain how the decision-making process can introduce distortions that can weaken even the strongest signals, making them vulnerable to being missed. We first examine the concept of weak signals and the challenges involved in detecting them. Then, drawing on the theoretical and empirical research in decision theory, we explain the role of the decision-making process in weakening and distorting strong signals. We present a model of the decision-making process based on prospect theory representing missed red flags as judgement and evaluation errors. We argue that the two phases of the decision-making process cause distortions in information, evidence, data and signals that are relevant to assessing an individual’s likely engagement in terrorism. We end the paper with some recommendations that can be implemented to mitigate the problems identified in the paper.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Heuristics include representativeness, availability and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

  2. In reality, lower probabilities would be attached to higher and higher outcomes. This is simply due to the distribution of outcomes from different attack methods over time.

References

  • Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and real authority in organizations. J Polit Econ 105:1–29

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alicke MD, Govorun O (2005) The better-than-average effect. In: Alicke MD, Dunning D, Krueger J (eds) The self in social judgment. Psychology Press, New York, pp 85–106

    Google Scholar 

  • Altabbaa G, Raven AD, Laberge J (2019) A simulation-based approach to training in heuristic clinical decision-making. Diagnosis 6:91–99

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Ansoff HI (1975) Managing strategic surprise by response to weak signals. Calif Manag Rev 18:21–33

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ansoff HI (1980) Strategic issue management. Strateg Manag J 1:131–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barnea A (2018) Challenging the “lone wolf” phenomenon in an era of information overload. Int J Intell Counterintell 31:217–234

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bean H (2009) Organizational culture and US intelligence affairs. Intelligence and National Security 24:479–498

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bechky BA, Okhuysen GA (2011) Expecting the unexpected? How SWAT officers and film crews handle surprises. Acad Manag J 54:239–261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benoit J, Dubra J, Moore DA (2015) Does the better-than-average-effect show that people are overconfident? J Eur Econ Assoc 13:293–329

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black F (1986) Noise. J Financ 41:529–543

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blainey GA (1973) The causes of war. Free Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein BH, Emler AC (2001) Rationality in medical decision-making: a review of the literature on doctor’s decision-making biases. J Eval Clin Pract 7:97–107

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Brynielsson J, Horndahl A, Johansson F, Kaati L (2013) Harvesting and analysis of weak signals for detecting lone wolf terrorists. Security Informatics 2:1–15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carp S, Shapira Z (2016) Heuristics and biases and strategic decision-making. In: Augier M, Teece DJ (eds) The Palgrave encyclopaedia of strategic management

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen EA, Gooch J (1990) Military misfortunes: the anatomy of failure in war. Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen K, Johansson F, Kaati L, Mork JC (2014) Detecting linguistic markers for radical violence in social media. Terror Polit Violenc 26:246–256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davies PHJ (2004) Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States. Camb Rev Int Aff 17:495–520

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Bondt W, Thaler RH (1995) Financial decision-making in markets and firms: a behavioral perspective. In: Jarrow RA, Maksimovic V, Ziemba WT (eds) Finance, handbooks in operations research and management science, 9, Amsterdam, North Holland, pp 385–410

  • Dearborn DC, Simon HA (1958) Selective perception: a note on the departmental identifications of executives. Sociometry 21:140–144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deutsche-Welle (2017) German police predicted Berlin terror attack nine months prior. Deutsche-Welle, March 26

  • Dunning D, Heath C, Suls JM (2004) Flawed self-assessment: implications for health, education, and the workplace. Psychol Sci Public Interest 5:69–106

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Fearon JD (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. Int Organ 49:379–414

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Federal Bureau of Investigation (2019) Joint Terrorism Task Forces. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces. Accessed 7 Aug 2019

  • Fischhoff B, Beyth R (1975) I knew it would happen: remembered probabilities of once-future things. Organ Behav Hum Perform 13:1–16

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gabriel RA (1985) Military incompetence. Hill & Wang, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Garicano L, Posner RA (2005) Intelligence failures: an organizational economics perspective. J Econ Perspect 19:151–170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grubb MD (2015) Overconfident consumers in the marketplace. J Econ Perspect 29:9–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haeckel SH (2004) Peripheral vision: sensing and acting on weak signals. Long Range Plan 37:181–189

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hodgkinson GP, Bown NJ, Maule AJ, Glaister KW, Pearman AD (1999) Breaking the frame: an analysis of strategic cognition and decision-making under uncertainty. Strateg Manag J 20:977–985

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holopainen M, Toivonen M (2012) Weak signals: Ansoff today. Futures 44:198–205

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Janis IL (1971) Groupthink. Psychol Today 5:84–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Jervis R (1976) Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson DDP (2004) Overconfidence and war: the havoc and glory of positive illusions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson DDP, Wrangham RW, Rosen SP (2002) Is military incompetence adaptive? An empirical test with risk taking in modern warfare. Evol Hum Behav 23:245–264

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson DDP, McDermott R, Barrett ES, Cowden J, Wrangham R, McIntyre MH, Rosen SP (2006) Overconfidence in war games: experimental evidence on expectations, aggression, gender and testosterone. Proc R Soc 273:2513–2520

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman D (2011) Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47:263–291

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koivisto R, Kumala I, Gotcheva N (2016) Weak signals and damage scenarios: systematics to identify weak signals and their sources related to mass transport attacks. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 104:180–190

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laamanen T, Maula M, Kajanto M, Kunnas P (2018) The role of cognitive load in effective strategic issue management. Long Range Plan 51:625–639

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lampel J, Shapira Z (2001) Judgemental errors, interactive norms and the difficulty of detecting strategic surprises. Organ Sci 12:599–611

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lebow RN (1981) Between peace and war: the nature of international crisis. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Lim RG (1997) Overconfidence in negotiation revisited. Int J Confl Manag 8:52–79

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lopes LL, Oden GC (1999) The role of aspiration level in risky choice: a comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory. J Math Psychol 43:286–313

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Loughran T, McDonald B (2011) Barron’s red flags: do they actually work? J Behav Financ 12:90–97

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meissner P, Wulf T (2013) Cognitive benefits of scenario planning: its impact on biases and decision quality. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 80:801–814

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meissner P, Wulf T (2014) Debiasing illusion of control in individual judgement: the role of internal and external advice-seeking. Rev Manag Sci 10:245–263

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meissner P, Brands C, Wulf T (2017) Quantifying blind spots and weak signals in executive judgement: a structured integration of expert judgement into the scenario development process. Int J Forecast 33:244–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mendonca S, Cardoso G, Caraca J (2012) The strategic strength of weak signal analysis. Futures 44:218–228

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meszerics T, Littvay L (2009) Pseudo-wisdom and intelligence failures. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 23:133–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mischel W, Ebbesen EB, Zeiss AM (1976) Determinants of selective memory about the self. J Consult Clin Psychol 44:92–103

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Momigliano A (2017) Why terror suspects in Europe slip through security cracks. Washington Post, June 9

  • Moore DA, Healy PJ (2008) The trouble with overconfidence. Psychol Rev 115:502–517

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • O’Connell AJ (2006) The architecture of smart intelligence: structuring and overseeing agencies in a post-9/11 world. Calif Law Rev 94:1655–1744

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perlmutter A (1978) Military incompetence and failure: a historical, comparative and analytical evaluation. J Strateg Stud 1:121–138

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prendergast C (1993) A theory of yes men. Am Econ Rev 83:757–770

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberto MA, Bohmar RMJ, Edmondson AC (2006) Facing ambiguous threats. Harvard Business Review, November, 106–113

  • Ross L (1977) The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution process. Adv Exp Soc Psychol 10:173–220

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schakel J, van Fenema PC, Faraj S (2016) Shots fired! Switching between practices in police work. Organ Sci 27:391–410

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schoemaker PJH, Day GS (2009) How to make sense of weak signals. Sloan Management Review, Spring, 81–89

  • Schroeder K, Chan W, Fahey T (2011) Recognising red flags in general practice. InnovAiT 4:171–176

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scott I (2009) Errors in clinical reasoning: causes and remedial strategies. Br Med J 338:b1860

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slovic P, Fischhoff B, Lichtenstein S (1977) Behavioural decision theory. Annu Rev Psychol 28:1–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strack F, Mussweiler T (1997) Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: mechanisms of selective accessibility. J Pers Soc Psychol 73:437–446

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Svenson O (1981) Are we all less risky and more skilful than our fellow drivers? Acta Psychol 94:143–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tetlock PE, Skitka L, Boettger R (1989) Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: conformity, complexity and bolstering. J Pers Soc Psychol 57:632–640

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Tuchman B (1984) The march of folly: from Troy to Vietnam. Alfred A. Knopf, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Tversky A, Kahneman D (1974) Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 185:1124–1131

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wyden P (1979) Bay of Pigs. Simon & Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Zajac EJ, Bazerman MH (1991) Blind spots in industry and competitor analysis: implications of inter-firm (mis)perceptions for strategic decisions. Acad Manag Rev 16:37–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Business, Education, Law and Arts, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Queensland, 4350, Australia

    Peter J. Phillips & Gabriela Pohl

Authors
  1. Peter J. Phillips
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Gabriela Pohl
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Peter J. Phillips or Gabriela Pohl.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

The paper is theoretical and does not involve data or human subjects.

Informed Consent

The paper is theoretical and does not involve human subjects.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Phillips, P.J., Pohl, G. How Terrorism Red Flags Become Weak Signals Through the Processes of Judgement and Evaluation. J Police Crim Psych 35, 377–388 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-019-09345-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-019-09345-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation