Influence of strategy continuity on cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with migrating players

Complex Science Management
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Abstract

The phenomenon of cooperation is prevalent in both nature and human society. In this paper a simulative model is developed to examine how the strategy continuity influences cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s games in which the players migrate through the success-driven migration mechanism. Numerical simulations illustrate that the strategy continuity promotes cooperation at a low rate of migration, while impeding cooperation when the migration rate is higher. The influence of strategy continuity is also dependent on the game types. Through a more dynamic analysis, the different effects of the strategy continuity at low and high rates of migration are explained by the formation, expansion, and extinction of the self-assembled clusters of “partial- cooperators” within the gaming population.

Keywords

evolution of cooperation continuous strategies spatial prisoner’s dilemma game migration 

CLC number

N93 N94 

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Copyright information

© Wuhan University and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Systems EngineeringDalian University of TechnologyLiaoningChina
  2. 2.School of Software TechnologyDalian University of TechnologyLiaoningChina

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