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A new relay attack on distance bounding protocols and its solution with time-stamped authentication for RFID

  • Security of Information System
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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

Abstract

Relay attack is one of the most threatening challenges against radio frequency identification(RFID) now. Distance bounding protocols have been introduced to thwart relay attacks. They form a family of challenge-response authentication protocols and confirm the round-trip time at the Rapid Bit Exchange phase. They enable a reader to authenticate and to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to an entrusted tag. We design an effective attack against a family of such protocols to launch the spoofing attacks within effective distance successfully, which demonstrates that existing protocols cannot eliminate such attacks completely. The thesis proposes a new program with time- stamping verification to correct the defect and verify the effectiveness.

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Correspondence to Huanguo Zhang.

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Foundation item: Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61332019)

Biography: WEI Guoheng, male, Ph.D. candidate, research direction: cryptology and information security.

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Wei, G., Zhang, H. & Wang, Y. A new relay attack on distance bounding protocols and its solution with time-stamped authentication for RFID. Wuhan Univ. J. Nat. Sci. 21, 37–46 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-016-1136-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-016-1136-y

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