Abstract
This paper presents an improved simple power attack against the key schedule of Camellia. While the original attack required an exact determination of the Hamming weight of intermediate data values based on power measurements, in this paper, two types of the simple power attack are presented and shown to be tolerant of errors that might occur in the Hamming weight determinations. In practical applications of the attack, such errors are likely to occur due to noise and distortion in the power measurements and their mapping to the Hamming weights of the data. To resist these attacks, the required design rationale of key schedules and several practical countermeasures are suggested.
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This article was retracted due to copyright violation.
Foundation item: Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60673072) and the Natural Basic Research Program of China (2007CB311201)
An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11859-009-0616-8
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Liu, S., Ni, H., Hu, Y. et al. An improved simple power attack against Camellia’s key schedule. Wuhan Univ. J. Nat. Sci. 13, 591–594 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-008-0516-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-008-0516-3