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Forward-secure digital signature scheme with tamper evidence

  • Published:
Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences

Abstract

Based on the definition of tamper evidence, the authors define a new notion of tamper evidence forward secure signature scheme (TE-FSig), and propose a general method to build a TE-FSig scheme. Based on this method, they also give out a concrete instance. A TE-FSig scheme is constructed by the standard signature scheme, forward secures signature scheme and the aggregate signature scheme. It has an additional property of tamper evidence besides the property of forward secure, which can detect the time period when the key is exposed. In the standard model, the scheme constructed in the paper is proved to satisfy the properties of forward secure, strong forward tamper-evidence secure, and strongly unforgeable under the chosen-message attack.

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Correspondence to Qiuliang Xu.

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Foundation item: Supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (Y2007G37)

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Jiang, H., Xu, Q. & Lin, F. Forward-secure digital signature scheme with tamper evidence. Wuhan Univ. J. Nat. Sci. 13, 582–586 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-008-0514-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11859-008-0514-5

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